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Privatizing Criminal Procedure 
JOHN D. KING* 
As the staggering costs of the criminal justice system continue to rise, 
states have begun to look for nontraditional ways to pay for criminal 
prosecutions and to shift these costs onto criminal defendants. Many 
states now impose a surcharge on defendants who exercise their constitu-
tional rights to counsel, confrontation, and trial by jury. As these “user 
fees” proliferate, they have the potential to fundamentally change the na-
ture of criminal prosecutions and the way we think of constitutional 
rights. The shift from government funding of criminal litigation to user 
funding constitutes a privatization of criminal procedure. This intrusion 
of market ideology into the world of fundamental constitutional rights 
has at least two broad problems: it exacerbates structural unfairness in a 
system that already disadvantages poor people, and it degrades our con-
ception of those rights. This Article proposes solutions to ameliorate the 
harshest effects of these rights-based user fees but also argues for the im-
portance of resisting the trend of the privatization of constitutional trial 
rights.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Although overall incarceration has decreased slightly since the high-water mark 
of 2008,1 
See U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2008,  at 1, 8 (2010), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p08.pdf (finding that “federal and state correctional authorities had 
jurisdiction over” 1.6 million people and the total incarcerated population including jails exceeded 2.4 
million at the end of 2008). 
the United States still processes a staggering number of people through its 
various criminal justice systems.2 
See Peter Wagner & Wendy Sawyer, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2018, PRISON POL’Y 
INITIATIVE (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2018.html [https://perma.cc/EUP9- 
DXLC] (detailing the American criminal justice system and the number of people held within each 
facility or program). 
The overall size of the criminal justice apparatus 
shows no sign of decreasing in any significant way, and counties, states, and the fed-
eral government struggle to find funding to support this massive project. User fees 
are the latest effort to provide funding for courts, prosecutors, prisons, and other 
costly features of the modern American criminal justice system. 
As states continue to deal with ever-increasing budget pressures, many have 
begun to look for nontraditional ways to pay for criminal prosecutions and to shift 
the costs of the system onto those charged with crimes. As these user fees prolif-
erate, they have the potential to fundamentally change the nature of criminal 
prosecutions and the way we think about exercising constitutional rights. The 
shift from government funding of the processes and procedures of criminal litiga-
tion to user funding constitutes a privatization of criminal procedure.3 
The most familiar user fee, which has been adopted by an increasing number 
of states in the last two decades, is the requirement that indigent defendants repay 
the state for the costs of their court-appointed lawyers.4 States have also begun to 
assess additional costs for defendants in drug cases if the defendant refuses to 
waive her Confrontation Clause rights under the Sixth Amendment and requires a 
drug analyst to appear in court to testify regarding the chemical testing of the sub-
stance at issue in the case.5 Similarly, many states now charge criminal defend-
ants who elect a jury trial the costs of empaneling a jury.6 In each of these 
examples, the state fixes a surcharge for those defendants who elect to exercise a 
constitutional right. Criminal defendants are charged a fee for the exercise of their 
Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, confrontation, and trial by jury. 
Courts long ago squarely rejected as unconstitutional the practice of user fees 
in the context of voting.7 Holding that states could not condition a citizen’s right 
to vote on her ability to pay even a small amount, the Supreme Court in Harper v. 
Virginia Board of Elections struck down Virginia’s poll tax as violating 
1. 
2. 
3. See infra Part III. 
4. See infra Section I.A. 
5. See infra Section I.B. 
6. See infra Section I.C. 
7. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966). 
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principles of equal protection.8 Courts have been far more indulgent, however, in 
evaluating state requirements that those accused of crime pay for the costs of 
exercising Sixth Amendment rights within the context of their own criminal 
prosecution. 
These à la carte procedural fees have proliferated over the past quarter-century 
and this growing phenomenon calls for reexamination. National events over the 
last few years have made the issue of criminal costs and fees even more timely 
and urgent than before. The 2015 report from the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
concerning Ferguson, Missouri, for example, highlighted the city’s practice of 
using criminal costs and fees to fund municipal operations.9 
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 42–43 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/ 
2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [hereinafter THE FERGUSON REPORT]. 
In 2016, the DOJ 
advised state courts that common court practices involving the imposition and 
collection of costs and fees associated with criminal charges may violate princi-
ples of due process and equal protection.10 
See Letter from Karol V. Mason, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Justice Programs, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Vanita Gupta, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, & Lisa Foster, Dir., Office for Access to Justice, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Colleagues 
(Mar. 14, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/832541/download [https://perma.cc/S6X4-GBFK]. This 
guidance was later rescinded by Attorney General Jeff Sessions. See Matt Zapotosky, Sessions Rescinds 
Justice Dept. Letter Asking Courts to Be Wary of Stiff Fines and Fees for Poor Defendants, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/sessions-rescinds-justice-dept- 
letter-asking-courts-to-be-wary-of-stiff-fines-and-fees-for-poor-defendants/2017/12/21/46e37316-e690- 
11e7-ab50-621fe0588340_story.html?utm_term=.4d796e17e059 [https://perma.cc/58AM-3UTT]. 
Understanding the current problem requires a reexamination of the evolution 
of these rights.11 At least since Gideon v. Wainwright,12 a clear tension has existed 
between the expanded understanding of formal trial rights for those accused of 
crime and the practical costs associated with implementing those rights. The 
Supreme Court in Gideon recognized a constitutional obligation on states to pro-
vide counsel for those unable to afford private counsel, but it did not explain how 
states are to pay for this requirement.13 This tension between recognition of a con-
stitutional right and the requirement that government fund the exercise of that 
right runs through the Court’s recent jurisprudence on the Confrontation Clause, 
in which the Court acknowledged that a robust and broad understanding of con-
frontation rights would increase the costs of criminal trials.14 
The willingness of American criminal justice systems to allow for user fees to 
be assessed for the exercise of constitutional rights is closely related to the 
8. See id. at 665 (“For it is enough to say that once the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may 
not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
9. 
10. 
11. See infra Part I. 
12. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
13. See id. at 344. At the time Gideon was decided, thirty-five states already provided counsel for 
indigent defendants accused of crimes, either by state constitution or by statute. See Brief for the State 
Gov’t as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (No. 62- 
155) (“Today thirty-five states require counsel in non-capital cases, which is a strong indication of the 
fundamental nature of that right in the modern view.”). 
14. See infra Section I.B. 
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neoliberal market model that has come to dominate American criminal justice.15 
As long as the process is neutrally applied and the rules equally enforced, judges 
and prosecutors are not seen as responsible for ensuring fair or equitable out-
comes.16 Adversarial (free-market) criminal justice systems care less about accu-
racy of result and fairness of outcome than about simply ensuring that the 
existing procedures are applied correctly. As with the free-market economic 
model, the free-market criminal justice model promises equality of opportunity 
and process, but not a result that is necessarily fair or just.17 Putting a price tag on 
the processes of criminal procedure by way of user fees, however, threatens even 
the promise of procedural neutrality upon which the adversarial system is built. 
Allowing—or even encouraging—the waiver of rights designed to ensure ac-
curacy has a detrimental effect beyond the immediate or individual impact on 
any given defendant. A broad and robust right to counsel in our adversarial sys-
tem is justified not only to protect individual defendants but also to safeguard the 
integrity of the system.18 The effects of these practices lie beneath the immedi-
ately visible surface. There is little current evidence showing that statutes requir-
ing payment by defendants for the costs of their appointed counsel have a chilling 
effect on the exercise of that right.19 When considered with the additional and 
growing variety of user fees, however, it is likely that this phenomenon reduces 
the actual procedural safeguards that theoretically attend criminal trials. This out-
come is especially probable with regard to low-level crimes that constitute the  
15. See DARRYL K. BROWN, FREE MARKET CRIMINAL JUSTICE: HOW DEMOCRACY AND LAISSEZ 
FAIRE UNDERMINE THE RULE OF LAW 19 (2016) (“Criminal process puts a priority on giving parties 
procedural opportunities but, as in the economic realm, the state is less committed to ensuring certain 
kinds of results.”). 
16.  See id. (“The state—especially in the form of the judiciary, but in other respects as well—does 
less to ‘coordinate’ certain kinds of outcomes, including, ultimately, the accuracy and proportionality of 
court judgments.”); see also Máximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The 
Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 1, 4 (2004) (“[W]hereas the adversarial system conceives criminal procedure as governing a 
dispute between two parties . . . before a passive decision-maker . . . , the inquisitorial system conceives 
criminal procedure as an official investigation, done by one or more impartial officials of the state, in 
order to determine the truth.”). 
17. See, e.g., In re Davis, 557 U.S. 952, 955 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This Court has never 
held that the Constitution forbids the execution of a convicted defendant who has had a full and fair trial 
but is later able to convince a habeas court that he is ‘actually’ innocent.”). 
18. See, e.g., Beth A. Colgan, Lessons from Ferguson on Individual Defense Representation as a 
Tool of Systemic Reform, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1171, 1220 (2017) (“Ferguson is illustrative of how 
a system grounded on constitutional deficiencies can be used as a tool for revenue generation, and how 
individual defense counsel can help to reform such systems of governance.”); Justin Murray, A 
Contextual Approach to Harmless Error Review, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1805–07 (2017) (noting that 
the “total deprivation of the right to counsel at trial” has been viewed as a “structural defect[]” which is 
not subject to the harmless error doctrine). 
19. See Ronald F. Wright & Wayne A. Logan, The Political Economy of Application Fees for 
Indigent Criminal Defense, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2045, 2078–81 (2006) (noting the lack of 
empirical evidence regarding waiver rates following the passage of application fee laws in states and 
conducting an independent study that concluded that application fee statutes did not “profoundly” shift 
waiver rates in the two states surveyed). 
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vast bulk of the nation’s criminal justice apparatus.20 
Beyond the practical effect of these user fees on the exercise of rights by 
defendants, this Article examines whether encouraging the alienability of these 
procedural rights changes the way we see them and further diminishes their role 
in our system of adjudication. Kimberly Krawiec has discussed three categories 
of forbidden exchange: “(1) illegal ones, (2) inalienable ones, and (3) those that 
are both legal and alienable, but in which exchange for profit is banned or lim-
ited.”21 Unlike markets in illegal drugs or other kinds of vice, we forbid the sale 
of civic rights like the right to vote or freedom of speech “not because we con-
sider the items and activities harmful to society, but because they are so closely 
tied to the individual’s rights and responsibilities as a member of the community 
that the state does not allow their separation.”22 We do, however, allow for a de-
fendant to “sell” her right to counsel or to a trial by jury in exchange for a reduc-
tion in court costs.23 
As we increasingly allow for the segmentation of criminal procedural rights, 
and for costs to be assessed à la carte for those who exercise these rights, the 
adversarial adjudication system becomes gradually priced beyond the reach of 
most criminal defendants. This Article argues that spreading the financial burden 
of the exercise of such rights across a broader range of social actors would 
remove the disincentive to actually exercise these rights. 
A system that is so reliant on funding from unwilling consumers necessarily 
ends up treating those who can pay better than those who cannot. Our system 
of criminal justice has been described as a “two-tiered system . . . where those 
who can pay their criminal justice debts can escape the system while those who 
are unable to pay are trapped and face additional charges for late fees, install-
ment plans, and interest. These extra charges have been referred to as ‘poverty 
penalties’”24 and constitute a significant increased burden on those who can 
least afford it.25 
See, e.g., REBEKAH DILLER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE HIDDEN COSTS OF FLORIDA’S 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE FEES (2010), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Justice/ 
FloridaF&F.pdf?nocdn=1 [https://perma.cc/LS2Y-N8XD] (describing Florida’s increasing reliance on 
criminal defendants to support its system of criminal justice). The report suggests that Florida 
“eliminated most exemptions for those unable to pay” the fees. Id. at 7. 
Part I of this Article examines the variety of user fees that now accompany 
criminal trials in state jurisdictions and the trend toward shifting the financial 
costs of criminal adjudication onto the criminally accused. The three main cate-
gories of fees that this Article addresses are those fees assessing defendants the 
20. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1320–21 (2012). 
21. See, e.g., Kimberly D. Krawiec, Foreword: Show Me the Money: Making Markets in Forbidden 
Exchange, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. i, i (2009). 
22. Id. 
23. Of course, plea bargaining is the ultimate “selling” of a fundamental right, although the trade 
there is one’s right to be presumed innocent in exchange for a shorter prison sentence. See Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 Yale L.J. 1969, 1975 (1992). 
24. Neil L. Sobol, Charging the Poor: Criminal Justice Debt & Modern-Day Debtors’ Prisons, 75 
MD. L. REV. 486, 492–93 (2016). 
25. 
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cost of their appointed counsel; those for a defendant demanding the presence of 
a forensic witness as, for example, in a prosecution involving drug possession or 
driving while intoxicated; and those charging a defendant the costs of empaneling 
a jury. Part II analyzes the doctrinal limitations that courts have placed on states 
seeking to impose a financial burden on defendants who exercise constitutional 
trial rights. Part III examines the impact of financial costs and fees on those peo-
ple who are predominantly the subjects of the American criminal justice system: 
poor people and people of color. This Part addresses not only the criminalization 
of poverty but also the growing concern that some courts have come to function 
more as revenue generators than as stabilizing social institutions. Finally, Part III 
also discusses some of the philosophical challenges in converting public rights 
into private commodities that can either be exercised or waived for financial rea-
sons. The Article concludes by proposing solutions to ameliorate the effects of 
these rights-based user fees and argues for the importance of resisting the trend 
towards privatizing constitutional trial rights. Fee waivers for indigent defendants 
are a necessary but inadequate reform. The Court should reconsider its decision 
in Fuller v. Oregon26 in light of the changed landscape of American criminal 
adjudication in recent decades. The exercise of trial rights should not be subject 
to a cost-benefit analysis. 
I. USER FEES IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Although many aspects of the criminal justice system have become monetized, 
this Article focuses on the imposition of costs and fees on defendants who elect to 
exercise certain constitutional trial rights. The rights enshrined in the Sixth 
Amendment are exercisable or waivable at the election of the accused.27 
Notwithstanding their alienability, each of these rights has been seen as funda-
mental to the adversarial system of criminal justice.28 Other issues relating to the 
costs and fees of criminal justice are outside of the scope of this Article, although 
the continued existence of a cash-based pretrial release system, for instance, pro-
vides another example of the ways in which poor people are systematically disad-
vantaged by the current state of criminal procedure in most American states.29 
26. 417 U.S. 40, 54 (1974) (upholding Oregon’s recoupment statute which provided that individuals 
convicted of crimes “who later become[] able to pay for [their] counsel may be required to do so”). 
27. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
28. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 329 (2009) (extending the reach of 
the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) 
(“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which—were they 
to be tried in a federal court—would come within the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee.”); Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (“[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person 
haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is 
provided for him.”). 
29. Other costs and fees that can be described as automatic or nondiscretionary are beyond the scope 
of this Article. Booking fees and the general court costs that are assessed upon conviction, for example, 
are, in some jurisdictions, assessed against anyone convicted of a criminal offense. See Wayne A. Logan 
& Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary Criminal Justice, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1175, 1186. Such booking fees 
can range from just a few dollars to several hundred dollars. See id. at 1186 & nn.71–72. Some of these 
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The Sixth Amendment dictates how American criminal accusations are adjudi-
cated, at least in theory: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed . . .; to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to 
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.30 
Each of these rights has evolved over the more than two centuries since the ratifi-
cation of the Bill of Rights,31 and each has been a contested site in which stake-
holders have argued the relative merits of efficiency, fairness, accuracy, and 
justice.32 Nowhere in the Sixth Amendment are these procedural safeguards guar-
anteed to defendants without cost, and recently states have moved toward charg-
ing defendants for the exercise of these rights. 
Although states have charged fees for those convicted of crimes since the nine-
teenth century,33 there is a new trend of charging those facing criminal charges 
additional fees for the exercise of various constitutionally mandated trial rights.34 
What might have been the first user fee in the criminal context was imposed in 
1846, when Michigan authorized the recovery of medical costs from prisoners.35 
See Lauren-Brooke Eisen, Paying for Your Time: How Charging Inmates Fees Behind Bars May 
Violate the Excessive Fines Clause, 15 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 319, 319 & n.3 (2014) (“In 1846, the United 
States saw the birth of the first correctional fee law when Michigan enacted legislation authorizing 
counties to charge sentenced jail inmates for the costs of medical care.” (citing DALE PARENT, NAT’L 
INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RECOVERING CORRECTIONAL COSTS THROUGH OFFENDER FEES 
1 (1990), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/125084NCJRS.pdf)). 
Over a century later in 1965, California introduced a mandatory crime victim fee 
for those convicted of crimes.36 
See Joseph Shapiro, As Court Fees Rise, the Poor Are Paying the Price, NPR (May 19, 2014, 
4:02 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312158516/increasing-court-fees-punish-the-poor [https:// 
perma.cc/9RGJ-4XWU]. 
And Michigan again showed its innovative streak 
when it became the first state to charge prisoners for a portion of the costs of their  
fees are imposed regardless of whether the charge results in a conviction. See id. at 1195 (noting that 
some asset forfeitures, allowing governments to seize money and property from individuals, occur only 
after criminal conviction whereas others go on “regardless of the outcome in criminal proceedings”). 
For a detailed taxonomy of the costs and fees associated with all stages of the criminal process, see 
Laura I. Appleman, Nickel and Dimed Into Incarceration: Cash-Register Justice in the Criminal System, 
57 B.C. L. REV. 1483, 1492–516 (2016). 
30. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
31. See JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, THE RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 20 (2002) (“In 1791, that provision became the Sixth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.”); see also supra note 28. 
32. See, e.g., TOMKOVICZ, supra note 31, at 20 (discussing the development and contested history of 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel). 
33. See Logan & Wright, supra note 29, at 1179 (discussing the extended history of criminal justice 
payments). 
34. See id. at 1184–86 (discussing the “expanding menu” of state-imposed fees on criminal 
defendants for use of the criminal justice system). 
35. 
36. 
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own incarceration.37 But these fees are imposed without regard to any actions or 
decisions of the defendant. Fees that are assessed only if the defendant exercises 
her right to counsel, to confront a witness, or to a jury trial, act as a surcharge on 
the invocation of those rights. 
A. RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
Described as the “master key” that guarantees other procedural trial rights for 
those accused of crime,38 the right to counsel has a long and contested history.39 
Enshrined in the Sixth Amendment40 and long held up as fundamental to a fair 
adversarial system, the contours of the right to counsel have fluctuated and 
evolved over modern American history.41 Although Gideon v. Wainwright and its 
progeny have defined the scope of the right to counsel and its applicability to the 
states,42 battles continue over who is entitled to court-appointed counsel, what is 
expected of court-appointed counsel, and who must ultimately pay for court- 
appointed counsel. And although the right of an indigent defendant facing a seri-
ous charge to court-appointed counsel is now clear,43 many states have adopted 
the practice of charging defendants for their exercise of that right.44 
Gideon and its progeny imposed constitutional requirements on state criminal 
prosecutions without providing a source of funding. As states struggled to come 
up with the resources to pay for the vast numbers of appointed counsel required 
to accommodate the ever-increasing number of criminal adjudications, many 
states experimented with shifting the costs onto the individual “consumers” of 
the systems: the accused.45 The move away from government provision of coun-
sel to a system in which the user is charged was consistent with the neoliberal 
economic project of the 1980s and 1990s.46 Before long, some state governments 
took on the appearance of debt collectors—seeking to recover the funds owed 
them by defendants through collection techniques that included garnishment of 
37. See id. (“Michigan, in 1984, passed the first law to charge inmates for some of the costs of their 
incarceration.”). 
38. Yale Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on “The Most 
Pervasive Right” of an Accused, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7 (1962). 
39. See generally TOMKOVICZ, supra note 31 (outlining the lengthy history and development of the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel). 
40. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to 
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”). 
41. See John D. King, Beyond “Life and Liberty”: The Evolving Right to Counsel, 48 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 8–15 (2013) (discussing the development, evolution, and current status of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel in American jurisprudence). 
42. See infra notes 53–56 and accompanying text. 
43. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963) (finding the federal right to court- 
appointed counsel for indigent defendants also applies to states). 
44. See Shapiro, supra note 36. 
45. See id.; see also Wright & Logan, supra note 19, at 2059 (discussing the emergence of fee 
proposals tied to budget cuts and “special budgetary stress for indigent criminal defense programs”). 
46. See Wright & Logan, supra note 19, at 2051–52 (“In keeping with the privatization strategies 
increasingly in vogue, many states tried to trim their criminal defense budgets by shifting the costs of 
such services back to the consumers—indigent criminal defendants.” (footnote omitted)). 
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wages, seizure of property, impoundment of vehicles, revocation of probation, 
and the threat of sentence enhancement because of unpaid fees.47 
Initially understood as a negative right that only forbade government actors 
from interfering with a defendant’s ability to choose and retain counsel of her 
choice,48 the right to counsel evolved in the twentieth century into an affirmative 
right, obligating the government to provide counsel to those accused of serious 
crime. Powell v. Alabama marked the first time that the United States Supreme 
Court recognized a defendant’s right to court-appointed counsel.49 Reversing the 
rape convictions of nine African-American defendants tried in Alabama state 
court without any meaningful appointment of counsel, the Supreme Court held 
for the first time that, at least in certain serious cases in which the defendants 
were incapable of mounting their own defense or retaining counsel, the 
Fourteenth Amendment required states to appoint counsel for defendants.50 The 
Court, stressing the serious and extreme nature of the charges and the defendants’ 
inability either to represent themselves or to secure trial counsel, created an 
extremely narrow rule limited to the facts of the case before it.51 Nevertheless, 
Powell established the important principle that the Sixth Amendment’s right to 
counsel, through the Fourteenth Amendment, did bind the states in certain cir-
cumstances and did endow a positive right to court-appointed counsel, rather than 
a more limited negative right against state interference.52 
Three decades after Powell, Gideon v. Wainwright made the right to court- 
appointed counsel categorical, holding in definite terms that defendants facing 
serious charges in state courtrooms have a federal constitutional right to court- 
appointed counsel.53 In felony prosecutions, such as the one at issue in Gideon, 
the Court rejected any weighing of factors or balancing tests and instead found a 
47. See id. at 2053–54 (discussing the different fee collection methods used by several states). 
48. See Alfredo Garcia, The Right to Counsel Under Siege: Requiem for an Endangered Right?, 29 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 35, 42 (1991) (noting “that ‘the right to counsel meant the right to retain counsel of 
one’s own choice and at one’s expense’” (quoting WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN 
AMERICAN COURTS 21 (1955))); see also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 370 (1979) (“There is 
considerable doubt that the Sixth Amendment itself, as originally drafted by the Framers of the Bill of 
Rights, contemplated any guarantee other than the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution in a 
federal court to employ a lawyer to assist in his defense.”). 
49. 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (finding the constitutional right to appointed counsel in specific 
circumstances of capital cases). 
50. See id. The Court noted that: 
[I]n a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable 
adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, 
or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a 
necessary requisite of due process of law; and that duty is not discharged by an assignment at 
such a time or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the prep-
aration and trial of the case.  
Id. 
51. See id. (concluding that the specific circumstances necessitated counsel). 
52. See id. (“[W]e are of the opinion that, under the circumstances just stated, the necessity of 
counsel was so vital and imperative that the failure of the trial court to make an effective appointment of 
counsel was likewise a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
53. 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963). 
2019] PRIVATIZING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 569 
categorical right to court-appointed counsel.54 The expansive holding of Gideon 
was subsequently extended to cases that involved actual incarceration (rather 
than simply the potential for incarceration), even in misdemeanor prosecutions.55 
In Scott v. Illinois, however, the Court limited the scope of the right to appointed 
counsel, holding that in criminal prosecutions that do not carry the possibility of 
incarceration, defendants do not enjoy any federal constitutional right to court- 
appointed counsel.56 
The specter of increased costs runs throughout the Supreme Court’s right-to- 
counsel cases, and resource constraints continue to interfere with the vision of 
Gideon.57 Beginning in the 1980s and 1990s, states struggled to pay for the costs 
associated with a dramatically expanding criminal justice system. The size of the 
criminal justice system exploded with the War on Drugs and costs of every aspect 
of the system rose accordingly. In the three decades between 1980 and 2010, 
the incarcerated population in the United States grew from approximately 500  
54. Id.; see King, supra note 41, at 10 (“Thus, in Gideon, the Court rejected a balancing-test 
approach in favor of a categorical requirement of counsel, at least in felony cases.”). 
55. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972) (“[I]n those [misdemeanors] that end up in the 
actual deprivation of a person’s liberty, the accused will receive the benefit of ‘the guiding hand of 
counsel’ so necessary when one’s liberty is in jeopardy.”). 
56. 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (“[W]e believe that . . . actual imprisonment is a penalty different in 
kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment . . . [thus] warrant[ing] adoption of actual 
imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel.”). 
57. See King, supra note 41, at 39 (“[C]ost-based arguments have been made against every 
expansion of the right to counsel.” (citing Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 431–34 (2011))); see also 
Scott, 440 U.S. at 373–74 (limiting the scope of the right to appointed counsel to prosecutions that 
involve actual incarceration); Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 49–50 (Powell, J., concurring) (contending that 
indigent defendants should not automatically be afforded counsel for “petty offenses”). See generally 
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344 (“[P]rocedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before 
impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law . . . cannot be realized if the 
poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.”). 
The Supreme Court has an inconsistent record regarding whether and how it should consider the 
practical costs of recognizing a new constitutional right in the field of criminal procedure. The issue is 
explicitly addressed in many of the right-to-counsel cases and in Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436, 481 
(1966) (“[W]e are not unmindful of the burdens which law enforcement officials must bear . . . .”). But 
some of the Justices have taken the position that consideration of costs is always inappropriate in 
construing constitutional protections for those accused of crime. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 
75 (1970) (Black, J., concurring) (stating that the “value of a jury trial far outweigh[s]” all costs to 
society for “‘all crimes’ and ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions’”). For a contrary opinion, see Justice 
Breyer’s suggestion that “judges, in applying a text in light of its purpose, should look to consequences, 
including ‘contemporary conditions, social, industrial, and political, of the community to be affected.’ 
And since ‘the purpose of construction is the ascertainment of meaning, nothing that is logically relevant 
should be excluded.’” STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION 18 (2005) (footnote omitted). 
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in District Attorney’s Office v. Osborne shows a Justice who is 
considering the real-world costs of recognizing a new constitutional protection. 557 U.S. 52, 83–84 
(2009) (Alito, J., concurring) (discussing the financial implications of post-conviction DNA testing). As 
support for his position against recognizing a right of defendants to obtain and test DNA after 
conviction, Alito referred to the “severe backlogs in state crime labs.” Id. at 84. 
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thousand to more than 2.3 million.58 
Jail, Prison, Parole, and Probation Populations in the US, 1980–2013, PROCON.ORG (Jan. 28, 
2015, 12:03:03 PM), https://felonvoting.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=004353 [https:// 
perma.cc/PCH4-N27N]. 
During roughly the same period, total expen-
ditures by states and municipalities on corrections rose from approximately $17 
billion to approximately $71 billion.59 
POLICY & PROGRAM STUDIES SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., STATE AND LOCAL EXPENDITURES ON 
CORRECTIONS AND EDUCATION 1 (2016), https://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/other/expenditures- 
corrections-education/brief.pdf. 
And among all of the other associated 
costs, states had to find the money to pay the court-appointed defense lawyers 
that the system required. 
The trend of charging criminal defendants for court-appointed counsel took off 
in the 1990s, growing from seven jurisdictions in 1994 to twenty-seven in 2006.60 
By 2017, at least forty-three states had adopted the practice.61 The explosion of 
such fees took place in geographically and politically diverse states from 
California and Massachusetts to Kansas and Georgia.62 Typically, the genesis of 
these user fees for criminal defendants using appointed counsel arose out of a 
budgetary shortfall and indigent defense funding crisis, with the leadership of 
public defender agencies reconciling themselves to support such fees as better 
than the alternative, in light of budget cuts by the state legislatures.63 Coalitions 
between tough-on-crime legislators and leaders of the criminal defense establish-
ment have led to the proliferation of these fees.64 
States vary in the specifics of how they charge defendants for their court- 
appointed counsel. Some assess application fees at the beginning of a criminal 
prosecution, while others charge a recoupment fee that is added to other court 
costs at the conclusion of the prosecution.65 Of those that exact after-the-fact 
recoupment fees, some assess a flat fee for each criminal count, and some require 
payment from the defendant of all defense costs accrued in the defense of a case,  
58. 
59. 
60. Wright & Logan, supra note 19, at 2052–54 (noting the uptick in jurisdictions imposing fees on 
defendants). 
61. See Shapiro, supra note 36 (“The NPR survey found, with help from the Brennan Center for 
Justice at New York University School of Law, that in at least 43 states and D.C., defendants can be 
billed for a public defender.”). 
62. See Wright & Logan, supra note 19, at 2054. In addition, Wright and Logan document a 
fascinating political and cultural dynamic within the public defender community around this issue of 
allocating some of the costs of appointed counsel onto defendants, with the higher-level administrators 
generally in favor of such mechanisms (if only begrudgingly in the face of inadequate state funding) and 
the rank-and-file public defenders generally opposed to the assessment of such fees on their clients, for 
both philosophical and pragmatic reasons. See id. at 2047 (articulating the “counterintuitive” dynamic of 
those within the public defender system who support user fees and those who resist those fees). 
63. See id. at 2055 (“[The defense leadership’s] objectives are to avert immediate budgetary troubles 
and to establish credibility with legislators and other ‘repeat players’ in the arena of crime politics, such 
as law enforcement officials.”). 
64. See id. at 2069–70 (describing the political coalitions that “have made possible the recent broader 
private subsidization movement, aptly referred to as ‘pay-as-you-go’ criminal justice”). 
65. See id. at 2046, 2052–54 (discussing the variation in ways that states assess user fees and noting 
the shift from recoupment fees to up-front application fees to decrease the administrative burden). 
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including costs of defense experts and investigators.66 States also vary greatly in 
the extent to which they factor in a defendant’s ability to pay, with some states 
ignoring that factor altogether.67 
B. RIGHT TO CONFRONT 
The right to confront adverse witnesses has been one of the most widely dis-
cussed areas of criminal procedure in the past decade or so.68 The constitutional 
command that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him”69 recently became the 
basis of yet another fee that can be imposed on criminal defendants. This provi-
sion of the Constitution was subjected to a radical reappraisal in Crawford v. 
Washington.70 Following Crawford, this portion of the Sixth Amendment is now 
interpreted to provide a broad procedural safeguard for criminal defendants at 
trial. In the context of forensic testing, for example, this right requires the prose-
cution to present its lab analysis through live witnesses.71 But who should be 
responsible for the costs associated with the appearance of those witnesses? 
One response of legislatures worried about the cost of defendants exercising these 
rights has been to impose the costs of doing so on the defendants themselves. 
After receiving little attention for the first century after its adoption, the 
Confrontation Clause was interpreted in Mattox v. United States to be a “general 
rule[]” that “must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and 
the necessities of the case.”72 This relaxed approach to the right of confrontation 
66. Beth A. Colgan, Paying for Gideon, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1929, 1931 n.5 (2014) (“In addition to 
attorney’s fees, indigent defendants may be charged for the costs of experts, investigators, and other 
costs related to their defense.”). 
67. See id. at 1929–30 (“[I]n many jurisdictions, consideration of whether one has the ability to pay 
for counsel is essentially meaningless, whereas in other jurisdictions, courts are required to impose 
recoupment without any such consideration at all.”). 
68. For a sampling of the vast recent literature on this topic, see generally Jeffrey Bellin, The 
Incredible Shrinking Confrontation Clause, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1865 (2012); Stephanos Bibas, Essay: 
Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend 
of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183 (2005); Michael D. Cicchini, Essay: Dead Again: The Latest 
Demise of the Confrontation Clause, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1301 (2011); Brandon L. Garrett, 
Constitutional Law and the Law of Evidence, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 57, 69–71 (2015); Gary Lawson, 
Confronting Crawford: Justice Scalia, the Judicial Method, and the Adjudicative Limits of Originalism, 
84 U. CHI. L. REV. 2265 (2017); Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 
747 (2005). 
69. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
70. 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004) (abandoning the “indicium of reliability” Confrontation Clause 
framework and holding that out-of-court statements that are “testimonial” will only satisfy the 
Confrontation Clause if the out-of-court declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a “prior 
opportunity for cross-examination”). 
71. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 329 (2009) (concluding that admission of lab 
analysis certificates against a defendant at trial violates his Sixth Amendment right to confront the 
witnesses against him). 
72. 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895). In Mattox, the defendant’s murder conviction had been reversed by 
the Supreme Court. Two witnesses who had testified at his initial trial had died by the time of his second 
trial and their testimony was read to the second jury over the defendant’s Confrontation Clause 
objection. Id. at 240. The Supreme Court affirmed Mattox’s second conviction, holding that the dictates 
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was further endorsed in 1980 in Ohio v. Roberts, in which the Supreme Court 
allowed out-of-court statements to be used against a criminal defendant as long 
as the declarant was shown to be unavailable and the out-of-court statement pos-
sessed “adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’”73 
In 2004, in Crawford, the Supreme Court breathed new life into the 
Confrontation Clause and overturned Roberts in no uncertain terms.74 The Court 
held that testimonial out-of-court statements could be admitted against a defend-
ant only if the declarant was unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior 
opportunity to confront the witness about the subject matter of the statement.75 In 
Crawford, the Supreme Court rejected the Roberts test as having departed imper-
missibly from the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause.76 The change 
was dramatic and immediate, and courts struggled to accommodate the new 
approach to the confrontation right. The Court quickly undertook the task of 
refining and clarifying its understanding of the confrontation right—seeking first 
to define “testimonial” in Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana,77 and 
then to address whether the Confrontation Clause had any regard for nontestimo-
nial hearsay,78 as well as to clarify whether and how a defendant could forfeit the 
protections of the Confrontation Clause through her own wrongful conduct.79 
In 2009 in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the Court again considered the 
scope of the newly redefined confrontation right, addressing whether a criminal 
defendant had similar confrontation rights when the out-of-court statement in 
question was a forensic analysis.80 In Melendez-Diaz, the Court considered 
whether a laboratory analysis from a state-employed lab technician certifying 
that a substance was cocaine fell within the scope of the Confrontation Clause.81 
of the Confrontation Clause were not absolute and that the reading of the prior testimony did not 
contravene “[t]he primary object” of the Clause. Id. at 242–43. 
73. 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
74. 541 U.S. at 68–69 (overruling Roberts). 
75. See id. at 68 (“Where testimonial evidence is at issue, however, the Sixth Amendment demands 
what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for crossexamination.”). 
76. See id. at 63 (“The unpardonable vice of the Roberts test, however, is not its unpredictability, but 
its demonstrated capacity to admit core testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly 
meant to exclude.”). 
77. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (holding that “[s]tatements are nontestimonial 
when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency”). 
Davis and Hammon were consolidated and argued together before the Court. See Hammon v. Indiana, 
546 U.S. 976 (2005). 
78. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (“Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent 
with the Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law . . . .”); see 
also Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 420 (2007) (recognizing “Crawford’s elimination of 
Confrontation Clause protection against the admission of [even] unreliable out-of-court nontestimonial 
statements”). 
79. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 355, 367–68, 377 (2008) (holding that criminal defendants 
forfeit their Sixth Amendment rights to confront adverse witnesses only when a judge determines that 
the defendant committed a wrongful act with the “particular purpose of making the witness unavailable” 
at trial). 
80. 557 U.S. 305, 309 (2009) (discussing the procedural posture and issue presented in the case). 
81. Id. at 308–09 (stating the issue before the Court). 
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The majority concluded that the laboratory certificates were testimonial state-
ments and that the analysts were witnesses against the defendant for purposes of 
Sixth Amendment protection.82 Accordingly, because the defendant had no prior 
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses (and because the witnesses were not 
shown to have been unavailable at trial), introduction of the laboratory certificates 
violated the defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights.83 Consequently, the prose-
cution would be required to present the lab technician for cross-examination if it 
intended to introduce a laboratory certificate.84 The Court did not resolve the 
question of who should bear the costs of presenting such a witness.85 
Predictions about the effects of Melendez-Diaz on the administration of crimi-
nal justice were swift, extreme, and divided. Despite Justice Scalia’s reassurance 
in the majority opinion that “the sky will not fall,”86 Massachusetts Attorney 
General Martha Coakley predicted that misdemeanor drug prosecutions “would 
grind to a halt” because of the decision.87 
Jenny Paul, Coakley: Forensics Testimony a Burden, BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 11, 2008), http://archive. 
boston.com/news/nation/articles/2008/11/11/coakley_forensics_testimony_a_burden/ [https://perma.cc/ 
TA5G-XZJD]. In her note, Deyrup provides useful statistics on the early impact of Melendez-Diaz and 
states’ response to the decision. Ivana Deyrup, Note, Causing the Sky to Fall: The Legal & Practical 
Implications of Melendez-Diaz, HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE, http://harvardlpr.com/online-articles/ 
causing-the-sky-to-fall-the-legal-practical-implications-of-melendez-diaz/ [https://perma.cc/D5MM- 
MLTX] (last visited Dec. 17, 2018). Chief of Law Enforcement for the Attorney General of Utah said, 
“[t]his case may well have the biggest financial impact in many years on the cost of policing and 
prosecution.” Ken Wallentine, PoliceOne Analysis: 12 Supreme Court Cases Affecting Cops, POLICEONE. 
COM (Nov. 11, 2009), https://www.policeone.com/legal/articles/1964272-PoliceOne-Analysis-12-Supreme- 
Court-cases-affecting-cops/ [https://perma.cc/6C2D-Y24R]. 
Along with the doctrinal arguments 
about the meaning and requirements of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation 
Clause and its applicability to the states, the Justices also engaged in a lengthy 
discussion about the costs of recognizing such a constitutional prohibition against 
out-of-court statements.88 The dissent focused on the “heavy societal costs” that 
the majority opinion imposed, not only in terms of the likelihood that some guilty 
defendants would go free, but also the increased financial cost of criminal trials 
82. Id. at 311 (“In short, under our decision in Crawford the analysts’ affidavits were testimonial 
statements, and the analysts were ‘witnesses’ for purposes of the Sixth Amendment.”). 
83. See id. at 311, 329 (stating the conclusion of the Court). 
84. See id. at 310–11 (requiring the prosecution to present the lab analyst for cross-examination to 
satisfy the defendant’s Confrontation Clause right). 
85. See id. at 341–42 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing the costs imposed on the administration of 
justice as a result of the majority’s decision). 
86. Id. at 325 (majority opinion). In the majority opinion, Justice Scalia claimed that the “dire 
predictions” of the dissent were exaggerated because “[i]t is unlikely that defense counsel will insist on 
live testimony whose effect will be merely to highlight rather than cast doubt upon the forensic 
analysis.” Id. at 328. 
87. 
88. Compare Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 326 (“Despite [this rule’s widespread use among states], 
there is no evidence that the criminal justice system has ground to a halt in the States that, one way or 
another, empower a defendant to insist upon the analyst’s appearance at trial.”), and id. at 328 (“[T]here 
is little reason to believe that our decision today will commence the parade of horribles respondent and 
the dissent predict.”), with id. at 341 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“By requiring analysts also to appear in 
the far greater number of cases where defendants do not dispute the analyst’s result, the Court imposes 
enormous costs on the administration of justice.”). 
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now that states would be forced to comply with this understanding of the confron-
tation right.89 The majority recognized that “[t]he Confrontation Clause may 
make the prosecution of criminal trials more burdensome.”90 It reasoned, how-
ever, that any potential increase in the cost of prosecution was not a valid consid-
eration in construing constitutional provisions,91 and also that the economic 
predictions of the dissent were exaggerated and overblown.92 This conversation 
about the economic costs of the newly understood right to confrontation contin-
ued in subsequent Confrontation Clause cases,93 and has not been resolved to the 
satisfaction of some prosecutors and state legislators, who are troubled by the 
increased costs of compliance. 
Another practical concern expressed after Melendez-Diaz was the prospect of 
gamesmanship by defendants and their lawyers in refusing to stipulate to certifi-
cates of analysis and thereby demanding the presence of the drug analyst without 
any meaningful intention to confront or cross-examine the witness.94 A represen-
tative from a Virginia Department of Forensic Science laboratory described the 
problem in vivid terms: “[I]n responding to thirteen subpoenas, analysts ‘spent 74 
hours out of the office, traveled 2,600 miles and testified only twice for a total of 
10 minutes. They were never questioned by the defense.’”95 
Alan Cooper, Prosecutors, Analysts Deal with Melendez-Diaz Fallout, VA. LAW. WKLY. (Nov. 
30, 2009), http://valawyersweekly.com/blog/2009/11/30/prosecutors-analysts-deal-with-melendez-diaz- 
fallout/ [https://perma.cc/N9JM-7ZXJ]. 
In response to Melendez-Diaz, states quickly drafted legislation to contain 
costs and head off the potential for gamesmanship among defendants (or defense 
attorneys) who might exercise their right to confront scientific witnesses solely in 
hopes that those witnesses would not appear in court. Kansas, for example, 
attempted to address this problem by allowing the admission of a certificate of 
analysis over the defendant’s formal objection “unless it appears from the notice 
of objection and grounds for that objection that the conclusions of the 
certificate . . . will be contested at trial.”96 The Kansas Supreme Court held that  
89. See id. at 342 (“The Court purchases its meddling with the Confrontation Clause at a dear price, a 
price not measured in taxpayer dollars alone. Guilty defendants will go free, on the most technical 
grounds, as a direct result of today’s decision, adding nothing to the truth-finding process.”). 
90. Id. at 325 (majority opinion). 
91. See id. (“The Confrontation Clause may make the prosecution of criminals more burdensome, but 
that is equally true of the right to trial by jury and the privilege against self-incrimination. The 
Confrontation Clause—like those other constitutional provisions—is binding, and we may not disregard 
it at our convenience.”). 
92. See id. (“We also doubt the accuracy of respondent’s and the dissent’s dire predictions.”). 
93. See, e.g., Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 652 (2011) (“We hold that surrogate 
testimony of that order does not meet the constitutional requirement. The accused’s right is to be 
confronted with the analyst who made the certification, unless that analyst is unavailable at trial, and the 
accused had an opportunity, pretrial, to cross-examine that particular scientist.”). 
94. See Deyrup, supra note 87 (discussing the concern of Melendez-Diaz opponents that defendants 
would call analysts without intending to contest their conclusions). 
95. 
96. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3437(a)(3) (West 2008), invalidated by State v. Laturner, 218 P.3d 23 
(Kan. 2009). 
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this statute violated the Confrontation Clause, as interpreted in Melendez-Diaz.97 
Statutes that shifted the burden of production onto criminal defendants seemed 
clearly unconstitutional after Melendez-Diaz,98 but notice-and-demand statutes 
seemed to present a way for states to accommodate the newly invigorated right to 
confront while still containing costs.99 The majority opinion in Melendez-Diaz 
itself provided guidance to states considering this approach, cautioning that states 
could not shift the burden of calling witnesses onto the defendant but could 
require that the defendant object in advance of trial to the state’s use of testimo-
nial hearsay at trial.100 
Just four days after deciding Melendez-Diaz, the Supreme Court agreed to 
consider the constitutionality of Virginia’s notice-and-demand statute in 
Briscoe v. Virginia.101 Seeing the writing on the wall, however, Virginia’s 
General Assembly quickly convened and altered its notice-and-demand statute 
to conform to the requirements set forth in Melendez-Diaz.102 The Supreme 
Court remanded Briscoe to the Supreme Court of Virginia,103 which concluded 
that the old notice-and-demand statute impermissibly shifted the burden of 
proof onto the defendant.104 
Virginia’s revised notice-and-demand statute, passed during a special session 
in 2009, responded not only to the Melendez-Diaz decision but also to the pre-
dicted dramatic rise in subpoenas for drug analysts.105 The notice-and-demand 
97. Laturner, 218 P.3d at 37–38 (striking portions of the Kansas statute as unconstitutional under the 
Sixth Amendment). 
98. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009) (“Converting the prosecution’s 
duty under the Confrontation Clause into the defendant’s privilege under state law or the Compulsory 
Process Clause shifts the consequences of adverse-witness no-shows from the State to the accused.”). 
99. Notice-and-demand statutes require the defendant to take some affirmative step to exercise her 
confrontation right but also require the government to secure the attendance of the witness in question 
after having been so notified. See id. at 326 (noting that “notice-and-demand statutes require the 
prosecution to provide notice to the defendant of its intent to use an analyst’s report as evidence at trial, 
after which the defendant is given a period of time in which he may object to the admission of the 
evidence absent the analyst’s appearance live at trial”). 
100. Id. at 324 (“[T]he Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on the prosecution to present its 
witnesses, not on the defendant to bring those adverse witnesses into court.”). The Court saw true notice- 
and-demand statutes as simply accelerating the timing of the defendant’s Confrontation Clause 
objection and therefore saw no constitutional infirmity with these statutes. See id. at 326–27. 
101. 559 U.S. 32 (2010). 
102. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-187, -187.1 (West 2017). 
103. Briscoe, 559 U.S. at 33. 
104. See Cypress v. Commonwealth, 699 S.E.2d 206, 213–15 (Va. 2010). 
105. SB 5007, 2009 Leg., Spec. Sess. (Va. 2009). In the nine months leading up to the Melendez- 
Diaz decision, “forensic analysts were subpoenaed an average of 528 times per month.” Stephen Wills 
Murphy & Darryl K. Brown, Essay: The Confrontation Clause and the High Stakes of the Court’s 
Consideration of Briscoe v. Virginia, 95 VA. L. REV. BRIEF 97, 98 (2010). In July, the month following 
the Melendez-Diaz decision, forensic analysts were subpoenaed 1,885 times with similar totals for 
subsequent months. Id.; see also Anne Hampton Andrews, Note, The Melendez-Diaz Dilemma: 
Virginia’s Response, a Model to Follow, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 419, 440–41 (2010) (describing 
similar statistics concerning the increase in subpoenas following Melendez-Diaz). The Virginia 
Department of Forensic Science painted a fairly bleak picture of the financial implications of Melendez- 
Diaz, noting that, given the number of analysts, vehicles, and budgetary increases required, the 
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statute passed in Virginia now requires any prosecutor wishing to introduce a cer-
tificate of analysis at trial in lieu of live testimony to provide notice to the defend-
ant at least twenty-eight days prior to the trial along with a notice of the 
defendant’s right to object to such out-of-court testimony.106 The defendant then 
has fourteen days within which to object to the admission of the certificate.107 If 
the defendant files such a timely objection, the certificate is rendered inadmissi-
ble.108 At no point is the defendant required to state a reason for her objection or 
to declare an intention to cross-examine any live witness who might appear.109 
The majority of American jurisdictions have now adopted some form of notice- 
and-demand statute similar to the Virginia statute.110 Some states go further and 
also require a certification that the requesting party intends to actually conduct a 
cross-examination.111 In those states, when the defendant does not then conduct 
the cross-examination certified to, she is charged an additional fee.112 Although 
such a requirement seems to violate the defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights 
as described in Melendez-Diaz, these statutes remain on the books in some states. 
When Virginia’s General Assembly adopted the notice-and-demand proce-
dures, it simultaneously added another provision that imposed a fee on defendants 
who exercised their rights under Melendez-Diaz.113 This addition was a change 
from the previous provision, which had provided that: 
The accused in any hearing or trial in which a certificate of analysis is offered 
into evidence shall have the right to call the person performing such analysis 
or examination . . . as a witness therein, and examine him in the same manner 
as if he had been called as an adverse witness. Such witness shall be sum-
moned and appear at the cost of the Commonwealth.114 
Commonwealth would struggle to assume the new financial burden. See Andrews, supra, at 440 
(discussing the realistic implications of the decision on Virginia’s financial state at that time). 
106. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-187.1(A)(1)–(2). 
107. See id. § 19.2-187.1(B). 
108. See id. (noting that if timely objection is made, the certificate is inadmissible unless “(i) the 
testimony of the person who performed the analysis or examination is admitted into evidence describing 
the facts and results of the analysis or examination during the [state’s] case-in-chief at the hearing or 
trial and that person is present and subject to cross-examination”; or “(ii) the objection is waived by the 
accused or his counsel in writing or before the court”; or “(iii) the parties stipulate before the court to the 
admissibility of the certificate”). 
109. See id. 
110. For a useful overview and taxonomy of notice-and-demand statutes, see Jennifer B. Sokoler, 
Note, Between Substance and Procedure: A Role for States’ Interests in the Scope of the Confrontation 
Clause, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 161, 181–96 (2010). 
111. For example, Alabama requires the requesting party to “include a statement of the basis upon 
which the requesting party intends to challenge the findings contained in the certificate of analysis.” 
ALA. CODE § 12-21-302(b) (2016). 
112. See id. (“If the request for subpoena is granted, and the requesting party subsequently fails to 
conduct the cross-examination previously certified to, the court shall assess against the requesting party, 
all necessary and reasonable expenses incurred for the attendance in court of the certifying witness.”). 
113. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-187.1(F) (West 2017) (imposing a fee on defendants who demand 
confrontation and are found guilty). 
114. Id. § 19.2-187.1(F) (West 1979) (amended 2009) (emphasis added). 
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The new statute amended the final sentence as follows: 
Such witness shall be summoned and appear at the cost of the Commonwealth; 
however, if the accused calls the person performing such analysis or examina-
tion as a witness and is found guilty of the charge or charges for which such 
witness is summoned, $50 for expenses related to that witness’s appearance at 
hearing or trial shall be charged to the accused as court costs.115 
With one hastily-appended provision, Virginia imposed a tax on the exercise of a 
defendant’s constitutional right to confront witnesses.116 
Several states currently impose costs on defendants who choose to exercise 
their confrontation right as defined in Melendez-Diaz; these states do so either ex-
plicitly as Virginia does or generally under a rule that imposes costs on defend-
ants for each witness called.117 The United States Supreme Court has not 
addressed in any of its recent Confrontation Clause decisions which party should 
bear the costs of producing these witnesses, or whether there is any constitutional 
problem with assessing defendants an extra fee for exercising their right to con-
front adverse witnesses. 
C. RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL 
The right to trial by jury is central to American notions of criminal justice, but 
even this right has become subject to user fees. The Sixth Amendment guaran-
tees: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed . . . .”118 As with the examples above concerning the 
defendant’s right to counsel and right to confront adverse witnesses, many states 
charge defendants for the exercise of their right to a jury trial. In Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, Justice Scalia wrote that the “jury-trial guarantee was one of the least con-
troversial provisions of the Bill of Rights. It has never been efficient; but it has 
always been free.”119 In many states, however, Justice Scalia’s observation is no 
longer true. 
115. Id. § 19.2-187.1(F) (West 2017) (emphasis added). 
116. See id. 
117. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-302(b) (assessing “all necessary and reasonable expenses” against 
a defendant who requests and receives a subpoena and then fails to conduct a cross-examination); COLO. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 181.3-701(2) (West 2018) (permitting the imposition of fees on the defendant, 
including “[t]he actual costs paid to any expert witness,” and “reasonable and necessary” fees for, inter 
alia, chemical analysis, upon a motion by the prosecutor); LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:847(E)(1)(b) (2016) 
(imposing on the defendant generalized witness subpoena fees); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7A-304(a)(7)– 
(9b), (11)–(13) (West 2017) (imposing $600 in fees to be assessed against the defendant upon 
conviction); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27-27 (2018) (imposing fees on the defendant for the costs of 
witnesses, blood tests, and other chemical analysis tests); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2187.1(B) (imposing a 
$50 fee on the defendant for costs related to witnesses who performed laboratory “analysis or 
examination” if the defendant is later found guilty). 
118. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
119. 530 U.S. 466, 498 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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Several states explicitly add a fee for the election of a jury trial. Delaware, for 
example, imposes an additional $78 per charge if the defendant elects a jury trial 
instead of a bench trial.120 Colorado,121 Illinois,122 Mississippi,123 Missouri,124 
Montana,125 Nevada,126 Ohio,127 Oklahoma,128 Texas,129 Virginia,130 West 
Virginia,131 and Wisconsin132 all provide expressly for an additional charge to be 
assessed against a defendant who elects a jury and is convicted. Other states have 
general statutes authorizing assessment of the costs and fees of the prosecution 
against a defendant, which could be read to include a larger fee if the defendant 
was tried by a jury. Washington even offers defendants a choice between a six- 
person and a twelve-person jury, with the larger jury commanding double the 
price.133 
Many states employ a two-tiered criminal adjudication system, within which a 
misdemeanor is tried initially before a judge but is then subject to a de novo 
appeal by the defendant to a higher court, at which point the case may be decided  
120. See DEL. CT. C.P. CRIM. R. 58(A) (charging defendants in the Court of Common Pleas $52 per 
charge in a non-jury case and $130 per charge in a jury case). 
121. See Christie v. People, 837 P.2d 1237, 1244 (Colo. 1992) (en banc) (finding that Colorado’s rule 
imposing a $25 jury fee—to be refunded upon acquittal or dismissal—is not “an undue burden on the 
right to a jury trial”). 
122. See People ex rel. Flanagan v. McDonough, 180 N.E.2d 486, 487 (Ill. 1962) (discussing the 
permissibility of a Chicago city law that allows for jury fees with an increase in fee associated with a 
twelve-person jury). 
123. See MISS. CONST. art. 14, § 261; see also 1994 Miss. Op. Att’y Gen. 254 (1994). 
124. See State v. Wright, 13 Mo. 243, 244 (1850) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the jury 
tax violated Missouri’s constitutional guarantee “that right and justice ought to be administered without 
sale, denial or delay”). 
125. See State v. Fertterer, 841 P.2d 467, 473 (Mont. 1992) (“[T]he constitutionality of the foregoing 
statute [allowing the court to assign costs for the jury as part of sentence] has been upheld against claims 
of a violation of due process rights under the Constitution.”), overruled on other grounds by State v. 
Gatts, 928 P.2d 114 (Mont. 1996). 
126. See Korby v. State, 565 P.2d 1006, 1006 (Nev. 1977) (upholding the imposition of costs, 
including jury fees, on those convicted but not for those acquitted). 
127. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2947.23(A)(2)(a) (West 2014) (imposing costs on a defendant for a 
jury if the jury has been sworn); see also 2003 Ohio Op. Att’y Gen. 16 (2003). 
128. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 153(A)(8) (West 2016) (authorizing the imposition of a $30 fee 
on a defendant “for each offense of which [he] is convicted” any time a jury is requested). 
129. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 102.004(a) (West 2015) (authorizing the imposition of 
jury fees against a defendant who has been convicted); see also id. art. 102.0045(a) (West 2011) 
(authorizing an additional fee of $4 to reimburse counties for the cost of jury services). 
130. See Kincaid v. Commonwealth, 105 S.E.2d 846, 848 (Va. 1958) (“The costs of a jury are an 
expense incident to the prosecution, and its collection violates no constitutional right of the accused.”). 
131. See State ex rel. Ring v. Boober, 488 S.E.2d 66, 71–72 (W. Va. 1997) (rejecting defendant’s 
argument that a statement notifying the defendant that he would pay “a jury fee if convicted, imposed an 
unreasonable burden upon the exercise of [his] constitutional right to a jury trial”). 
132. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 814.51 (West 2017) (authorizing assessment of one day’s jury fees, 
including all mileage costs, against the defendant if a jury is demanded and demand is later withdrawn 
within two business days of trial). 
133. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.18.016(3)(b) (West 2016) (imposing different costs based on 
the size of the jury); WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 6.1(b) (allowing defendant to choose between a jury of 
six or twelve). 
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by a jury if state or federal law grants the defendant that right.134 Most of the 
states with such a system assess an additional charge for any defendant who choo-
ses to exercise her right to a jury trial, and in most instances the defendant must 
first have the case decided by a judge. Although these systems protect defendants’ 
rights in that they give the accused two bites at the apple, they also introduce a 
surcharge for the defendant who wants the protection of the jury. 
Arkansas, for example, has a two-tiered criminal trial system, in which misde-
meanors are initially triable either in district court or circuit court, entirely at the 
discretion of the prosecutor.135 Because anyone accused of any criminal violation 
has a right to be tried by a jury according to state law,136 those initially convicted 
in district court have the right to a de novo appeal to circuit court, in which that 
person may elect to be tried by a jury.137 To exercise that right to a jury trial, how-
ever, the accused must pay an extra $150 fee, which is nonrefundable regardless 
of whether the charge results in conviction, acquittal, or dismissal.138 Neither the 
Arkansas Code nor the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure appear to allow 
such fees to be waived in the case of indigent defendants attempting to exercise 
their right to a jury trial.139 
In Duncan v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court held that the right to a jury trial 
was fundamental to the American system of criminal justice and so bound the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.140 The Court explained the impor-
tance of the jury as “an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous 
prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.”141 Duncan held 
134. See generally David A. Harris, Justice Rationed in the Pursuit of Efficiency: De Novo Trials in 
the Criminal Courts, 24 CONN. L. REV. 381 (1992) (describing de novo trial systems employed by 
several states for the adjudication of misdemeanors). 
135. See 2001 Ark. Op. Att’y Gen. 298 (2001). 
136. ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 10. 
137. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-17-703 (2013) (stating that “the right of trial by jury [is] inviolate, 
[and] all appeals from judgment in district court shall be de novo to circuit court”); State v. Roberts, 900 
S.W.2d 175, 176 (Ark. 1995) (“[T]here is . . . no entitlement to a jury trial in a municipal court, but the 
right remains inviolate when an appeal is pursued to a circuit court where the case is tried de novo”). 
138. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-6-403 (West 2013). 
139. See Brief for Ark. Pub. Law Ctr. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner’s Writ of Certiorari to 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit at 7 n.3, Carrick v. Hutchinson, 136 S. Ct. 269 (2015) 
(mem.) (No. 15-204), 2015 WL 5466138 (noting that although “ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-6-403[(c) 
(2013)] contains an indigency exception for the $150 filing fee, it appears to refer only to civil litigants 
who ‘prosecute a cause of action’” (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-6-403(c) (West 2013)) (emphasis 
added)). 
140. See 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). The Supreme Court noted in Duncan that: 
Because we believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American 
scheme of justice, we hold that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in 
all criminal cases which—were they to be tried in a federal court—would come within the 
Sixth Amendment’s guarantee.  
Id. 
141. Id. at 156. During the Founding, Patrick Henry defended the importance of the jury as a local 
community protection against government overreach and intrusion, stating “[t]his gives me comfort— 
that, as long as I have existence, my neighbors will protect me.” THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE 
DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 438 (Neil H. Cogan ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1997). 
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that states were required to provide a jury trial for any defendant facing a “serious 
offense,” defined in that case as one carrying a potential sentence of at least a 
two-year period of incarceration.142 Two years after Duncan, the Court extended 
its definition of “serious offense” to include any crime for which the authorized 
imprisonment was more than six months.143 A crime for which the maximum 
authorized punishment is incarceration for six months or less is presumed to be a 
petty offense, and therefore outside of the scope of the federal constitutional right 
to a trial by jury.144 The Supreme Court has allowed, however, that this presump-
tion of pettiness is rebuttable if the defendant can show other indicia that demon-
strate seriousness.145 
Whether specific or general, waivable or not on the basis of indigency, and 
explained to the defendant in advance or added on to her bill after trial, each of 
these additional fees acts as a tax on the exercise of the jury trial right. States dif-
fer in their application of jury trial fees and the amount that defendants are 
charged. And many states have resisted the temptation to impose additional fees 
for defendants who exercise their right to a jury trial.146 But in many jurisdictions 
across the country, criminal defendants now must decide between keeping their 
costs down and exercising the right to a trial by jury. 
II. DOCTRINAL LIMITATIONS OF USER FEES 
Although the presumption in American courts is that the government bears the 
costs of prosecuting criminal cases, legislatures may impose specific costs on the 
defendant by statute.147 When such specific statutory authorization exists, courts 
tend to defer to the legislative prerogative to impose such costs and reject chal-
lenges to the constitutionality of those fees.148 Courts have placed limits on a 
142. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 157–58, 161–62. 
143. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970) (“[N]o offense can be deemed ‘petty’ for 
purposes of the right to trial by jury where imprisonment for more than six months is authorized.”); see 
also Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 542 (1989) (“The possibility of a sentence 
exceeding six months, we determined, is ‘sufficiently severe by itself’ to require the opportunity for a 
jury trial.” (quoting Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 69 n.6)). 
144. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543 (stating that for society’s purposes, a crime carrying a maximum 
prison term of six months or less can be understood as petty). 
145. See id. (discussing the rebuttable presumption that a crime carrying a sentence of six months or 
less is not entitled to a jury trial). For a fascinating opinion holding that the threat of deportation may 
entitle a defendant facing an otherwise petty conviction to a trial by jury, see Bado v. United States, 186 
A.3d 1243, 1251–52 (D.C. 2018). 
146. Alaska, Connecticut, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, and South 
Carolina are a few states in which either the legislature or the courts have rejected fees for jury trials. 
147. See United States v. Bevilacqua, 447 F.3d 124, 127 (1st Cir. 2006) (“The American legal 
tradition does not, absent specific statutory authority, require defendants to reimburse the government 
for the costs of their criminal investigations or their criminal prosecutions.”). 
148. See Logan & Wright, supra note 29, at 1207 (“On the whole, challengers lose more often than 
they win because courts defer to legislative judgments in enacting statutes that require the payment of 
specific costs or fees.” (first citing State v. Myers, 602 S.E.2d 796, 800–08 (W. Va. 2004), then citing 
State v. VanWinkle, 186 P.3d 1258, 1262 (Mont. 2008)). 
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legislature’s power to impose these costs and fees, however, where they are seen 
as having the potential to chill the exercise of the right in question.149 
One of the earliest attempts to challenge the imposition of fees on indigent 
defendants who had been appointed counsel at trial was the 1972 case of James v. 
Strange.150 David Strange was charged with first-degree robbery.151 With the as-
sistance of court-appointed counsel, Mr. Strange entered a plea of guilty to the 
reduced charge of pocket picking and was given a suspended sentence.152 When 
Mr. Strange was subsequently assessed a $500 fee for the recoupment of payment 
made by the state to his attorney, he argued that the assessment of the fee violated 
his constitutional right to equal protection.153 Although the Supreme Court agreed 
with Mr. Strange that the Kansas recoupment fee was unconstitutional, Justice 
Powell wrote a narrow opinion that focused on the specifics of the Kansas stat-
ute.154 The Kansas recoupment statute provided that an indigent defendant who 
does not repay the amount assessed within sixty days of being notified of the obli-
gation would have a judgment docketed against her and allowed for a lien to be 
executed on the defendant’s real estate.155 The state was also permitted to garnish 
the defendant’s wages, and the defendant was not entitled to exemptions that 
Kansas law allowed for other debtors.156 The Supreme Court found that the rela-
tively unfavorable treatment shown to debtors under the recoupment statute when 
compared to other types of debtors violated principles of equal protection.157 The 
Court found it especially troubling that even acquitted defendants were not only 
charged the recoupment fee, but were also subject to the unfavorable recovery 
terms and denied basic debtor exemptions.158 
The Court in Strange went to great lengths to avoid the broader issue of 
whether recoupment statutes violated the Sixth Amendment by chilling or deter-
ring the exercise of the right to counsel. Although the court below had ruled 
that the Kansas statute was unconstitutional because it “needlessly encourages 
indigents to do without counsel and consequently infringes on the right to  
149. See id. at 1208–09 & n.264 (citing Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 258 (1959); Griffin v. Illinois, 
351 U.S. 12, 16–19 (1956); State v. Dudley, 766 N.W.2d 606, 617 (Iowa 2009); State v. Tennin, 674 N. 
W.2d 403, 410–11 (Minn. 2004); and State v. Webb, 591 S.E.2d 505, 509–10 (N.C. 2004) as examples 
in which courts “limited or wholly invalidated the use of such fees . . . [when they] conclude that the fees 
unduly restrict the constitutional right to counsel of indigent defendants”). 
150. 407 U.S. 128, 128 (1972) (“This case presents a constitutional challenge to a Kansas 
recoupment statute, whereby the State may recover in subsequent civil proceedings counsel and other 
legal defense fees expended for the benefit of indigent defendants.”). 
151. Id. at 129. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. See id. at 135–36. 
155. Id. at 129–31, 129 n.3. 
156. Id. at 131. 
157. See id. at 140–41 (“[T]o impose these harsh conditions on a class of debtors who were provided 
counsel as required by the Constitution is to practice . . . a discrimination which the Equal Protection 
Clause proscribes.”). 
158. Id. at 139. 
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counsel,”159 the Supreme Court decided the case on the much narrower equal pro-
tection ground shown by the different treatment of debtors under Kansas law.160 
There is evidence that the Court did not want to discourage states from experi-
menting in their attempts to fund the growing need for indigent defense coun-
sel.161 The Court declined Mr. Strange’s invitation to provide a sweeping ruling 
that would eliminate or discourage recoupment fees: “Given the wide differences 
in the features of these statutes [among the various states that allow for recoup-
ment of fees for court-appointed counsel], any broadside pronouncement on their 
general validity would be inappropriate.”162 
The Supreme Court addressed the more general issue of the constitutionality of 
recoupment fees just two years later in 1974 in Fuller v. Oregon.163 In Fuller, the 
Court considered a challenge to Oregon’s recoupment statute, by which criminal 
defendants were required to repay costs of their own defense to the state after 
conviction.164 Charged with, inter alia, third-degree sodomy, Mr. Fuller was 
appointed counsel by the trial court after it concluded that he was indigent and 
therefore unable to hire his own lawyer.165 His court-appointed lawyer hired an 
investigator to work on his case.166 After pleading guilty to the charge of third- 
degree sodomy, Fuller was sentenced to a five-year period of probation, condi-
tioned upon him reimbursing the state for the costs of his defense—including 
both his lawyer’s and investigator’s fees and costs.167 
Fuller appealed his sentence, arguing that the state violated the Constitution in 
conditioning his successful completion of probation on his repayment of the fees 
for his court-appointed defense.168 The Court disagreed, however, finding no 
equal protection violation and no direct violation of the Sixth Amendment as 
159. Id. at 134 (quoting Strange v. James, 323 F. Supp. 1230, 1233 (D. Kan. 1971)). 
160. See id. at 140–41 (concluding that the Kansas statute violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
161. See Memorandum from J. Harvie Wilkinson III to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (Mar. 23, 1972) 
[hereinafter Memorandum from Wilkinson] (on file with the Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives, Washington 
& Lee University School of Law). 
162. Strange, 407 U.S. at 133. 
163. 417 U.S. 40, 41 (1974). 
164. Id. In a separate but related line of cases, the Supreme Court placed strict limits on when a 
judicial officer could personally benefit from the outcome of a case. In Tumey v. Ohio, for example, the 
Court invalidated a system in which the judge was paid a flat rate per conviction (but not for acquittals or 
dismissals), holding that the pecuniary interest of the judge cast doubt on the impartiality of the system. 
273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927). Half a century later, the Court similarly held that a system whereby judges 
were paid per warrant issued, but not for warrant applications that were denied, was unconstitutional. 
See Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 251 (1977) (per curiam). Instances in which the revenues 
generated went to the general fund (out of which the judge is paid) rather than to the judge personally, 
however, have been upheld. See Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61, 65 (1928) (finding the judge’s relationship 
to the city’s general fund was too remote to trigger constitutional concern). Thus, this line of cases 
suggests that although direct personal profit by a judicial officer from prosecution and conviction 
generally violates due process, no such general prohibition exists when a municipality or state profits in 
this manner. 
165. Fuller, 417 U.S. at 41. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 41–42. 
168. Id. at 42. 
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applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.169 Regarding Fuller’s 
equal protection claim, the Court held that differentiating between convicted 
defendants and those who were either acquitted or had their charges dismissed 
was constitutionally permissible, and that the distinction between those two 
classes of criminal defendants was not invidious.170 The Court put great weight 
on the fact that Oregon’s recoupment statute contained a number of exemptions 
for those unable to repay the state.171 These exemptions, the Court held, distin-
guished Fuller’s case from the statute at issue in James v. Strange.172 
The Court also rejected Fuller’s argument that Oregon’s recoupment statute 
violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, as applied to the states through 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.173 Fuller argued that 
Oregon’s statute could chill the exercise of a defendant’s constitutional right to 
counsel by making the exercise costly.174 Rejecting this claim, the Court reasoned 
that the potential burden of repaying the costs of court-appointed counsel did not 
interfere with the right to counsel guaranteed in Gideon v. Wainwright: 
We live in a society where the distribution of legal assistance, like the distribu-
tion of all goods and services, is generally regulated by the dynamics of private 
enterprise. A defendant in a criminal case who is just above the line separating 
the indigent from the nonindigent must borrow money, sell off his meager 
assets, or call upon his family or friends in order to hire a lawyer. We cannot 
say that the Constitution requires that those only slightly poorer must remain 
forever immune from any obligation to shoulder the expenses of their legal 
defense, even when they are able to pay without hardship.175 
Although recognizing that recoupment statutes could be found unconstitutional if 
they constituted a penalty on the exercise of the right to appointed counsel, the 
169. See id. at 50–52. 
170. Id. at 50 (“This legislative decision reflects no more than an effort to achieve elemental fairness 
and is a far cry from the kind of invidious discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause condemns.”). 
171. Id. at 47. 
172. See id. at 47–48 (“The legislation before us, therefore, is wholly free of the kind of 
discrimination that was held in James v. Strange to violate the Equal Protection Clause.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
Among the refinements absent in Strange but included in Oregon’s recoupment statute were that: only 
those defendants convicted of a crime could be forced to repay; only those who were able to repay the 
state could be required to do so; sentencing judges were required to consider each person’s finances in 
deciding whether to impose such a burden; and those required to repay the costs of their own defense 
could petition the sentencing court to reconsider and could not be held in contempt for failure to repay if 
they could show that the failure to do so was not intentional or in bad-faith. See id. at 45–46 (listing the 
“conditions [that] must be satisfied before a person may be required to repay the costs of his legal 
defense”). 
173. See id. at 51–52. 
174. See id. at 51. Although Fuller did not argue that his counsel was ineffective or that the fees 
assessed for those purposes constituted unreasonable compensation for his counsel, he “assert[ed] that a 
defendant’s knowledge that he may remain under an obligation to repay the expenses incurred in 
providing him legal representation might impel him to decline the services of an appointed attorney and 
thus ‘chill’ his constitutional right to counsel.” Id. 
175. Id. at 53–54. 
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Court found that Oregon’s statute was not such a penalty because it burdened 
only those who foreseeably had the ability to pay without hardship.176 
State and lower federal courts have occasionally ruled state recoupment stat-
utes unconstitutional when they have strayed from what the Supreme Court 
authorized in Fuller. For example, such statutes have been held unconstitutional 
if they do not inquire into a defendant’s ability to pay,177 if they do not afford the 
defendant the same exemptions and procedural protections given to other debtors 
under state law,178 and if the state seeks to treat defendants who have been acquit-
ted more harshly than defendants who have been convicted.179 In this way, Fuller 
has provided a roadmap to the states on how to require reimbursement of the costs 
of a defendant’s court-appointed lawyer without violating constitutional princi-
ples of due process, equal protection, or the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 
Challenges to the imposition of fees for the exercise of other constitutional 
rights are less frequent than those involving recoupment statutes in the right-to- 
counsel context. Courts have considered, both before and after Melendez-Diaz,180 
the extent to which states can constitutionally impose a burden, either financial or 
procedural, on a criminal defendant who wishes to confront a scientific witness at 
trial.181 Although simple notice-and-demand statutes have been held constitu-
tional, courts have struck down statutes that require a defendant to assert a spe-
cific objection to the out-of-court statement and grounds for that objection.182 In 
State v. Campbell, the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld the state’s notice- 
and-demand statute as a reasonable requirement, noting that although the statute 
required defendants who were able to pay to be assessed the costs of the 
176. Id. at 54. 
177. See, e.g., Olson v. James, 603 F.2d 150, 155 (10th Cir. 1979) (concluding that “a court should 
not order a convicted person to pay these expenses unless he is able to pay them or will be able to pay 
them in the future considering his financial resources and the nature of the burden that payment will 
impose” and noting that “[i]f a person is unlikely to be able to pay, no requirement to pay is to be 
imposed”); Fitch v. Belshaw, 581 F. Supp. 273, 277 (D. Or. 1984) (holding a state statute that imposed 
repayment obligations without any determination of the defendant’s ability to pay “unconstitutionally 
chill[ed] an indigent defendant’s exercise of [the] Sixth Amendment right to counsel”); State v. Dudley, 
766 N.W.2d 606, 623 (Iowa 2009) (“[I]mposing mandatory reimbursement without regard to ability to 
pay infringes an indigent defendant’s right to counsel.”); State v. Tennin, 674 N.W.2d 403, 410–11 
(Minn. 2004) (holding the state’s mandatory recoupment statute violated defendant’s federal and state 
right to counsel). 
178. See, e.g., Dudley, 766 N.W.2d at 616–17 (discussing the invalidity of an Iowa statute based on 
its denial of exemptions to the criminal defendant and noting that “the different treatment of acquitted 
defendants such as Dudley as compared to ordinary civil judgment debtors violates the Equal Protection 
Clause”). 
179. See, e.g., id. at 621–22 (holding an Iowa statute violated the acquitted defendant’s equal 
protection right because “there is no rational basis to deny acquitted defendants the benefit of the fee 
limitations afforded convicted defendants represented by the public defender”). 
180. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311 (2009) (requiring confrontation for 
testimonial laboratory results by laboratory analysts). 
181. See Sokoler, supra note 110, at 188 & n.145, 189–90. 
182. See, e.g., State v. Laturner, 218 P.3d 23, 37–38 (Kan. 2009) (concluding that the demands of 
Kansas’s statute exceeded those authorized in Melendez-Diaz and violated the defendant’s confrontation 
right). 
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laboratory witness’s appearance, the statute exempted indigent defendants from 
this financial burden.183 Similarly, in upholding Virginia’s notice-and-demand 
statute in a case that preceded Melendez-Diaz, the Virginia Court of Appeals 
noted that the Commonwealth bore costs associated with the scientific witness’s 
appearance at trial and upheld the statute as a “reasonable procedure” that “en-
courage[d] judicial and governmental economy.”184 Shortly after the Virginia 
Court of Appeals’ decision in Brooks, the Virginia General Assembly amended 
the statute at issue in significant ways, including by shifting the costs associated 
with calling a scientific witness onto the defendant who has been convicted “of 
the charge or charges for which such witness” was summoned.185 
Many states have looked unfavorably upon the practice of charging criminal 
defendants for the exercise of their right to be tried by a jury.186 Striking down the 
state’s jury trial fee in 1979, the New Hampshire Supreme Court declared that “a 
criminal defendant cannot be required to purchase a jury trial—even for so nomi-
nal a sum as eight dollars.”187 In concluding that such a fee violated the state 
Constitution, the court compared a jury trial fee to the voting poll tax that was 
struck down by the United States Supreme Court in Harper v. Virginia Board of 
Elections.188 In Harper, the Supreme Court declared that conditioning a person’s 
vote on payment of a fee violated principles of equal protection, “whether the citi-
zen, otherwise qualified to vote, has $1.50 in his pocket or nothing at all, pays the 
fee or fails to pay it. . . . To introduce wealth or payment of a fee as a measure of 
a voter’s qualifications is to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor.”189 Other 
states have flatly prohibited the practice of charging criminal defendants an addi-
tional fee for empaneling a jury, although often pursuant to principles of state law 
rather than federal law.190 
183. 719 N.W.2d 374, 378 (N.D. 2006) (“The statute . . . authorizes an indigent defendant to 
subpoena the director or employee of the state crime laboratory to testify at the preliminary hearing and 
trial at no cost to the defendant, making that witness available for confrontation.”). 
184. Brooks v. Commonwealth, 638 S.E.2d 131, 136 (Va. Ct. App. 2006). 
185. See SB 5007, 2009 Leg., Spec. Sess. (Va. 2009); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-187.1(F) (West 
2017); see also supra notes 101–06 and accompanying text. 
186. Although not involving a financial surcharge, the United States Supreme Court struck down the 
capital sentencing provision of the federal kidnapping statute as unconstitutional because it allowed for 
a capital sentence only after a jury trial. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968). The Court 
said that this provision placed too high a price on the exercise of one’s right to a jury trial. See id. at 581 
(“The inevitable effect of any such provision is, of course, to discourage assertion of the Fifth 
Amendment right not to plead guilty and to deter exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to demand a 
jury trial.”). 
187. State v. Cushing, 399 A.2d 297, 298 (N.H. 1979). 
188. See id. (comparing the “purchase [of] a jury trial” to the poll tax struck down in Harper v. 
Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966)). 
189. Harper, 383 U.S. at 668. 
190. See, e.g., People v. Hope, 297 N.W. 206, 208 (Mich. 1941) (“[A]ssessing costs against a 
defendant for a jury in a criminal case is not permissible under the laws of this State. Every person 
charged with a criminal offense has a constitutional right to a trial by jury.” (citation omitted)); People v. 
Kennedy, 25 N.W. 318, 320 (Mich. 1885) (“[I]t would be monstrous to establish a practice of punishing 
persons convicted of misdemeanors for demanding what the constitution of the state gives them[]—a 
trial by jury.”); see also T. Ward Frampton, The Uneven Bulwark: How (and Why) Criminal Jury Trial 
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III. THE PROBLEM WITH PRIVATIZING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
The proliferation of user fees in criminal procedure turns fundamental rights 
into commodities. Those charged with a crime can either buy enhanced proce-
dural protections or forego those safeguards to save money. The commodification 
of trial rights not only risks creating a secondary class of criminal justice for poor 
people,191 
Of course, a strong argument can be made that the American system of criminal justice has 
already developed into a two-tiered system, with overwhelmed public defenders handling the bulk of the 
criminal cases, while those few criminal defendants with money are able to hire private counsel and 
fully exercise their trial rights. See generally Phil McCausland, Public Defenders Nationwide Say 
They’re Overworked and Underfunded, NBC (Dec. 11, 2017, 5:55 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/ 
news/us-news/public-defenders-nationwide-say-they-re-overworked-underfunded-n828111 [https:// 
perma.cc/S4NU-7M6W] (noting that the public defender system “has been understaffed, underfunded 
and overwhelmed with cases for more than 30 years” and “shows no indication of getting better”). 
but also risks changing our conception of fundamental rights. Markets 
affect the way that society views goods, and a market in procedural protections 
for those accused of crime threatens to undermine the way society views the pur-
poses and objectives of the criminal justice system. 
A. PRINCIPLED PROBLEMS 
Many have acknowledged that the criminal adjudication system could not 
function if everyone charged with crime exercised the full panoply of trial rights 
afforded them by the Constitution.192 
See, e.g., Jenny Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 
1095 (2013) (discussing Michelle Alexander’s Op-Ed on the impact of refusal to plea bargain and the 
impracticality of the American criminal justice system if defendants were to assert all constitutional 
rights afforded to them (citing Michelle Alexander, Opinion, Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System, N. 
Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/opinion/sunday/go-to-trial-crash-the- 
justice-system.html?smid=pl-share [https://nyti.ms/2k7rnKy]). 
The American adversarial system has come 
to depend on most criminal defendants waiving their procedural rights and, there-
fore, the system makes the exercise of those rights costly.193 The most vivid and 
widespread example of this reality is our system of plea bargaining,194 in which a 
defendant who turns down a plea offer and forces the state to prove its case at trial 
is subject to the well-known “trial tax” and will likely spend more time behind  
Rates Vary by State, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 183, 211 & n.161 (2012) (citing Kennedy and Hope). Several 
states have, however, expressly considered and rejected this argument. See id. at 212 & n.165 (citing 
state court decisions considering but rejecting constitutional challenges to the imposition of jury fees). 
191. 
192. 
193. See Alexander, supra note 192. Alexander notes that: 
The Bill of Rights guarantees the accused basic safeguards, including the right to be 
informed of charges against them, to an impartial, fair and speedy jury trial, to cross-examine 
witnesses and to the assistance of counsel.  
But in this era of mass incarceration – when our nation’s prison population has quintupled 
in a few decades partly as a result of the war on drugs and the “get tough” movement – these 
rights are, for the overwhelming majority of people hauled into courtrooms across America, 
theoretical. More than 90 percent of criminal cases are never tried before a jury. Most people 
charged with crimes forfeit their constitutional rights and plead guilty.  
Id. 
194. See, e.g., Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012) (acknowledging that “criminal justice 
today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials”). 
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bars if convicted.195 
In his examination of the rhetoric of citizenship in Supreme Court cases, 
Bennett Capers concludes that the law’s vision of the “good citizen” as one who 
cooperates with law enforcement and freely waives her rights is troubling and at 
odds with the idea of a free and equal society.196 Capers critiques the Court’s 
repeated invocations of “good citizens” as those who will freely speak with law 
enforcement, notwithstanding their right to be left alone: “[T]here is something 
deeply problematic about a model of good citizenship that relies on citizens fore-
going their citizenship rights. Just as there is something problematic with a model 
of good citizenship that, in effect if not by design, chills democratic dissent.”197 
Capers goes on to argue that the problems with imposing cultural expectations 
of citizenship as a price to be paid for the exercise of rights do not fall equally on 
all citizens.198 The unequal distribution of power across social groups leads to a 
disproportionate burden on people of color in the actual exercise of their rights.199 
“We should be troubled by citizenship talk that implicitly requires minorities to 
prove or ‘work’ their citizenship, and to perform as passive, nonquestioning, and, 
indeed, as second-class citizens.”200 These critiques are as true in the context of 
trial rights as they are in the Fourth Amendment context with which Capers is pri-
marily concerned. We should be troubled by a criminal justice system that sys-
tematically discourages the exercise of trial rights by defendants, especially if 
that burden falls most heavily on already marginalized groups. The impact of à la 
carte procedural fees disproportionately affects poor people and people of color, 
leading to functionally different criminal adjudication systems based on access to 
money. 
Applying Capers’s formulation in the context of trial rights implicates citizen-
ship in two ways: financial and philosophical. The privatization or commodifica-
tion of trial rights requires a criminal defendant to purchase rights that should 
simply flow from citizenship, and that have previously been thought to be inci-
dent to citizenship. Moreover, the expectations of citizenship differ for marginal-
ized subjects of the criminal adjudication system. Poor people and people of 
color—the disproportionate subjects of American systems of criminal justice— 
195. See J. Vincent Aprile II, Judicial Imposition of the Trial Tax, 29 CRIM. JUST. 30, 31 (2014) 
(discussing the imposition of a trial tax on criminal defendants asserting their constitutional right to a 
trial); see also John H. Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It, 78 MICH. L. 
REV. 204, 213 (1979) (characterizing the trial tax as “that terrible attribute that defines our plea 
bargaining and makes it coercive and unjust: the sentencing differential by which the accused is 
threatened with an increased sanction for conviction after trial by comparison with that which is offered 
for confession and waiver of trial”). 
196. See I. Bennett Capers, Essay, Criminal Procedure and the Good Citizen, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 
653, 664–70 (2018). 
197. Id. at 700. 
198. See id. at 694–95 (discussing the racial inequality implications of “citizenship talk”). 
199. See id. at 694–96 (discussing the “extra work racial minorities . . . must do in order to enjoy a 
simulacrum of full citizenship status in their interactions with the police”). 
200. Id. at 700. 
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are expected to passively acquiesce in the restriction of their trial rights and to 
accept the limited form of citizenship that is offered to them. 
The history of states’ attempts to impose poll taxes on those wishing to exer-
cise their right to vote is instructive. Defended by states as simply attempts to 
fund the electoral process, these surcharges on the right to vote also discouraged 
participation in elections.201 After initially finding no constitutional infirmity in 
state poll taxes,202 the Supreme Court later reversed itself, concluding that such 
taxes were an unconstitutional infringement on the right to equal protection.203 
In 1937, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected a challenge to the practice 
of poll taxes in state elections, holding that Georgia’s imposition of a one dollar 
per year poll tax on men between the ages of twenty-one and sixty was constitu-
tional.204 Georgia’s law prohibited anyone from voting who could not show that 
they had paid the poll tax, exempting men over sixty as well as all women from 
the requirement.205 The Court rejected arguments that this voting restriction vio-
lated either the Equal Protection Clause or the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause.206 
Less than three decades later, however, the Court changed course. In Harper v. 
Virginia State Board of Elections, the Court held that Virginia’s poll tax “not 
exceeding $1.50” violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.207 The Court made clear that “a State violates the Equal Protection 
Clause . . . whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an 
electoral standard.”208 The Court criticized Virginia’s poll tax, stating that “the 
right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of 
other basic civil and political rights.”209 Finally, the Court concluded that the 
introduction of wealth or payment as a factor in the exercise of the right to vote 
constituted invidious discrimination on the basis of wealth that could not be toler-
ated, and that the relatively modest amount of the required fee did not affect the 
unconstitutional nature of the poll tax.210 Because of the fundamental nature of 
201. See David Schultz & Sarah Clark, Wealth v. Democracy: The Unfulfilled Promise of the Twenty- 
Fourth Amendment, 29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 375, 391 (2011) (describing the poll tax’s varied history, 
most notably its adoption in the South after the Civil War with the intention of disenfranchising African 
Americans and poor whites). 
202. See Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 281–84 (1937) (holding Georgia’s poll tax 
constitutional), overruled by Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
203. See Harper, 383 U.S. at 664, 670 (holding Virginia’s poll tax unconstitutional). 
204. See Breedlove, 302 U.S. at 283–84. 
205. See id. at 280–82. 
206. See id. at 281–84. 
207. Harper, 383 U.S. at 664 n.1, 670 (holding that “‘the opportunity for equal participation by all 
voters’ . . . is required” and thus striking the state’s poll tax (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 
566 (1964))). 
208. Id. at 666. 
209. Id. at 667. The Court expressed no disapproval, however, of the use of literacy tests as a 
prerequisite to allowing a citizen to vote, believing that the ability to read and write “has some relation 
to standards designed to promote intelligent use of the ballot.” Id. at 666 (quoting Lassiter v. 
Northampton Cty. Bd. Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959)). 
210. Id. at 668 (“The degree of the discrimination is irrelevant.”). 
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the right to vote, “any alleged infringement . . . must be carefully and meticu-
lously scrutinized.”211 Subsequent cases have upheld other types of voting regula-
tions, such as requirements that a person seeking to vote produce identification,212 
but have not retreated from Harper’s prohibition against any fee for voting.213 
Just as the right to vote is “preservative,” the right to counsel is fundamental to 
the exercise of all other procedural rights and safeguards that attend a criminal 
trial in the United States. And the rights to confront witnesses and to have one’s 
case decided by a jury are similarly fundamental to our notions of a fair criminal 
justice system. The arguments advanced by the Court in Harper should apply 
with equal force in the context of constitutional trial rights designed to ensure 
fairness and accuracy. 
Over the past several decades, we have created various markets in the realm of 
criminal procedure. The most well-recognized and studied has been the defendant’s 
right to trial, which can be waived in exchange for various types of consideration.214 
Indeed, criminal defendants now waive their right to trial in over ninety-five percent 
of cases, trading in that commodity for either a reduction in charges, a shorter sen-
tence, or both.215 
See Erica Goode, Stronger Hand for Judges in the ‘Bazaar’ of Plea Deals, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 
2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/us/stronger-hand-for-judges-after-rulings-on-plea-deals. 
html?smid=pl-share [https://nyti.ms/2k2RLBD] (stating that “97 percent of federal cases and 94 percent 
of state cases end in plea bargains, with defendants pleading guilty in exchange for a lesser sentence”). 
In his book, Free Market Criminal Justice: How Democracy and 
Laissez Faire Undermine the Rule of Law, Darryl Brown describes plea bargaining 
as a deregulated free-market system, which is defined by 
the private market’s moral indifference to effects of unequal resources among 
contracting parties, its exceedingly thin concept of coercion, and its minimal 
regulation of outcomes according to criteria of fairness rather than party con-
sent. In these respects and many others, democratic and market norms in crimi-
nal justice simultaneously supplant legal rules and facilitate expansive state 
enforcement authority.216 
We seem to have entered what could be described as the Lochner era217 of crimi-
nal adjudication, as the ideology of private party control has occupied the field 
211. Id. at 667 (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561–62). 
212. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008) (holding that the “application 
of the statute [requiring citizens to present identification when voting] to the vast majority of Indiana 
voters is amply justified by” legitimate state interests). 
213. See id. at 198 (“The fact that most voters already possess a valid driver’s license, or some other 
form of acceptable identification, would not save the statute under our reasoning in Harper, if the State 
required voters to pay a tax or a fee to obtain a new photo identification.”). 
214. See Ric Simmons, Private Plea Bargains, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1125, 1173–74 (2011) (discussing 
the tradeoff of waiving one’s constitutional right to trial to receive lower levels of punishment or other 
benefits and noting that “[u]nder this model, giving the defendant[] more procedural rights—a more 
robust Miranda right, for example, or more extensive discovery rights—is in reality simply giving the 
defendant more to bargain away”). 
215. 
216. BROWN, supra note 15, at 12. 
217. See id. at 63 (describing how the “Supreme Court leveraged [the Lochner principle of liberty of 
contract] in service of a strongly laissez-faire conception of capitalism, to strike down a range of 
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without a corresponding focus on disparate bargaining power.218 As market-based 
norms and rhetoric have come to dominate how we think of criminal 
adjudication, it becomes more difficult to maintain norms and rhetoric that are 
centered on dignity, justice, and fairness.219 
Many states have procedures that allow defendants to pay money to avoid ei-
ther jail time or, in some cases, criminal prosecution altogether.220 Deferred pros-
ecution agreements allow someone suspected of criminal activity to agree to pay 
a victim or the state, or to engage in other activities in exchange for an agreement 
by the state not to prosecute.221 Such agreements have been widely used (and 
criticized) in prosecutions of corporations suspected of violating financial and 
other laws.222 Similarly, many states condition entry into a pretrial diversion pro-
gram on the defendant’s payment of a diversion fee; those unable to pay the fee 
are ineligible for the program.223 Even beyond the pretrial context, such preferen-
tial treatment for those with the ability to pay extra costs and fees continues after 
judgment, with some states charging convicted defendants for the costs of their 
own incarceration and supervision.224 And some states now also allow prison cell 
upgrades for prisoners able to pay extra.225 
Ironically, the constitutionality of recoupment statutes seems to depend upon a 
widespread ignorance of their existence. As the Supreme Court of California 
expressed in invalidating that state’s recoupment statute prior to Fuller: 
[A]s knowledge of [the recoupment] practice has grown and continues to grow 
many indigent defendants will come to realize that the judge’s offer to supply 
economic and social welfare legislation—nascent steps in the direction of a coordinated-market 
economy”). See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (invalidating a state labor law 
that set out maximum hours employees could work in bakeries because “the freedom of master and 
employé [sic] to contract with each other in relation to their employment, and in defining the same, 
cannot be prohibited or interfered with, without violating the Federal Constitution”). 
218. See BROWN, supra note 15, at 13 (“[T]he modern trend has been to expand parties’ control over 
the adjudication process, and American justice systems have in some important respects gone further 
down this road, giving one or both parties the ability to waive nearly all rights and procedures.”). 
219. See id. at 63 (“One reason for this relative paucity of attention [paid to how free-market 
ideology influences American criminal justice] is that market rationality in American criminal 
procedure law is almost too obvious to warrant notice.”). 
220. See Logan & Wright, supra note 29, at 1188 (detailing the practice of pretrial abatement, in 
which “local law or practice allows defendants in minor cases to pay an amount to the police or the 
courts that stops the prosecution from going forward”). 
221. See id. at 1187 (discussing the use of deferred prosecution agreements). 
222. See BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH 
CORPORATIONS 68–70 (2014) (detailing fines paid in corporate “deferred prosecution or non-prosecution 
agreements” and noting that the “fines sound significant” but are, on average, only 0.04% of the 
respective corporation’s market capitalization). 
223. See Logan & Wright, supra note 29, at 1187–88 (discussing the charges associated with pretrial 
diversion programs). 
224. See id. at 1192–93 (detailing probation and parole fees). 
225. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS 3 (2012) 
(noting that today “almost everything is up for sale,” for example: “A prison cell upgrade: $82 per night. 
In Santa Ana, California, and some other cities, nonviolent offenders can pay for better accommodations 
—a clean, quiet jail cell, away from the cells for nonpaying prisoners” (footnote omitted)). 
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counsel is not the gratuitous offer of assistance that it might appear to be; that, 
in the event the case results in a grant of probation, one of the conditions might 
well be the reimbursement . . . for the expense involved. This knowledge is 
quite likely to deter or discourage many defendants from accepting the offer of 
counsel despite the gravity of the need for such representation as emphasized 
by the [Supreme] [C]ourt in Gideon . . . .226 
The constitutionality of post-Fuller recoupment statutes—or any elective trial 
right—rests on a belief that they do not chill the exercise of the right to counsel 
because so few people know about the surcharges involved.227 As they become a 
more routine feature of criminal adjudication, however, this argument falls apart, 
and the user fees will deter the invocation of fundamental rights just as the 
California Supreme Court predicted in In re Allen. 
Although we talk of defense lawyers, juries, and confrontation as being essen-
tial to the American system of criminal justice, practices increasingly discourage 
the actual use of these features of adversarialism, especially in misdemeanor 
courtrooms. A system that is serious about actually using these procedural safe-
guards could easily implement practices to encourage their use, the simplest of 
which would be eliminating the costs and fees associated with invoking them. 
B. PRAGMATIC PROBLEMS 
Increased costs and fees interfere with key criminal justice goals, such as reha-
bilitation and successful reentry, making it more difficult for those with convic-
tions to obtain housing and employment, and to succeed on probation, parole, or 
supervised release.228 In addition to making it objectively more difficult for those 
226. In re Allen, 455 P.2d 143, 144 (Cal. 1969) (en banc); see also Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 51 
(1974) (quoting this language from In re Allen). 
227. Justice Powell’s opinion in James v. Strange found that recoupment statute unconstitutional on 
very narrow grounds but did not address whether the statute impermissibly chilled the exercise of the 
right to counsel. 407 U.S. 128, 139–42 (1972). In a cover note to a draft of the opinion, law clerk J. 
Harvie Wilkinson III discouraged Powell from finding it unconstitutional because it chilled the exercise 
of the right to counsel: “Once we get into the business of saying a particular statute chills the right to 
counsel, there will be no end to the chilling, no rational way to save these statutes.” Memorandum from 
Wilkinson, supra note 161. Wilkinson further counsels against using a due process rationale that the 
defendants are not given notice of the requirement to repay the state at the time of the exercise of their 
right to counsel: 
[O]nce we get to the point of requiring notice, then we are slowly falling into what I think 
would be the liberAL’s [sic] desires to have all of these statutes invalidated under the right to 
counsel thesis. If you have to notify a guy of the debt right before you assign him counsel, 
then it obviously is going to “chill” him a little bit, and all these recoupment statutes are in 
trouble.  
Id. 
228. See Katherine Beckett & Alexes Harris, On Cash and Conviction: Monetary Sanctions as 
Misguided Policy, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 509, 509–10 (2011); Traci R. Burch, Essay, Fixing 
the Broken System of Financial Sanctions, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 539, 542–43 (2011); Kirsten 
D. Levingston & Vicki Turetsky, Debtors’ Prison—Prisoners’ Accumulation of Debt as a Barrier to 
Reentry, 41 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 187, 191–92 (2007); Travis Stearns, Legal 
Financial Obligations: Fulfilling the Promise of Gideon by Reducing the Burden, 11 SEATTLE J. SOC. 
JUST. 963, 978 (2013). 
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involved in the criminal justice system to reestablish themselves as productive 
citizens, an overreliance on court costs and fees to fund the criminal justice sys-
tem affects the perceived procedural fairness of the system. In this way, and per-
haps unsurprisingly, poor people who have difficulty paying the costs of their 
own involvement in the criminal justice system perceive the system as less fair 
and more biased against them.229 
The Supreme Court in Strange also expressed a general critique of recoupment 
statutes as contrary to the public policy of successful reentry into society of those 
convicted of crimes: 
A criminal conviction usually limits employment opportunities. This is espe-
cially true where a prison sentence has been served. It is in the interest of soci-
ety and the State that such a defendant, upon satisfaction of the criminal 
penalties imposed, be afforded a reasonable opportunity of employment, reha-
bilitation and return to useful citizenship. There is limited incentive to seek 
legitimate employment when, after serving a sentence during which interest 
has accumulated on the indebtedness for legal services, the indigent knows 
that his wages will be garnished without the benefit of any of the customary 
exemptions.230 
All of these costs seem to come in exchange for little revenue. The futility of 
recoupment systems was recognized as early as 1972 by the Supreme Court in 
Strange: 
We do not inquire whether this statute is wise or desirable . . . . Misguided 
laws may nonetheless be constitutional. It has been noted both in the briefs and 
at argument that only $17,000 has been recovered under the statute in its 
almost two years of operation, and that this amount is negligible compared to 
the total expended.231 
More recent examinations of recoupment systems have shown a similarly poor 
return on investment.232 Of course, even if the fees imposed generate little reve-
nue, the statutes could still operate to keep costs down by discouraging the robust 
exercise of rights to which criminal defendants are entitled. 
Recently, the practice of using low-level courts as revenue generators has come 
under criticism. The Ferguson Report took a comprehensive look at the practice 
and condemned it, finding that the focus on revenue eclipsed any focus on  
229. See R. Barry Ruback et al., Perception and Payment of Economic Sanctions: A Survey of 
Offenders, 70 FED. PROB. 26, 26, 30 (2006). 
230. Strange, 407 U.S. at 139. 
231. Id. at 133. 
232. See R. Barry Ruback, The Benefits and Costs of Economic Sanctions: Considering the Victim, 
the Offender, and Society, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1805–09 (2015). 
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community safety or well-being.233 Court fees and costs act as a regressive tax 
that affects entire communities instead of just those accused of crime. But using 
court fees to pay not only for court expenses but also for other municipal services 
is an easy political sell, and the practice shows no sign of disappearing. And even 
in the face of data showing lackluster results in actually collecting money from 
those accused of crime, the imposition of such fees is a politically popular 
move.234 
As a result, the use and popularity of court costs and fees has greatly increased 
in recent years.235 
See THE FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 9, at 14 & n.12 (discussing the sources of Ferguson’s 
revenue and noting the amount that comes from court costs and fees); Claire Greenberg et al., The Growing 
and Broad Nature of Legal Financial Obligations: Evidence from Alabama Court Records, 48 CONN. L. 
REV. 1079, 1088 (2016) (showing the increase in fees “assessed as part of a felony conviction . . . over time 
in Alabama”); Shapiro, supra note 36; see also Shaila Dewan, A Surreptitious Courtroom Video Prompts 
Changes in a Georgia Town, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/05/us/a- 
surreptitious-courtroom-video-prompts-changes-in-a-georgia-town.html [https://nyti.ms/1LZTjIh] 
(discussing the use of court fees in a small town in Georgia); Jacob Shamsian, An Alabama Town Is 
Being Accused of Violating People’s Rights with a Practice that Was Outlawed 200 Years Ago, BUS. 
INSIDER (Sept. 10, 2015, 1:14 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/aclu-sues-alexander-city- 
over-debtors-prison-2015-9 [https://perma.cc/G42H-AW79]. 
In Alabama, for example, the funding for the state court system shifted dramatically from 2008, in 
which roughly half of the state court appropriations came from money generated by the courts, to 2013, 
in which almost all of the revenue was “generated by the courts.” See Greenberg et al., supra, at 1101. 
Criminal defendants have increasingly been seen as the answer 
to the funding problems that have befallen states and municipalities as cash- 
strapped legislatures have reduced funding without meaningfully addressing 
hyper-incarceration or shrinking the size of the criminal justice apparatus. Some 
municipalities have even used their criminal justice systems as profit centers, 
funding other governmental functions through criminal costs and fees.236 
See THE FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 9, at 10; AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, IN FOR A PENNY: 
THE RISE OF AMERICA’S NEW DEBTORS’ PRISONS 8 (2010), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/ 
field_document/InForAPenny_web.pdf (discussing the use of legal financial obligations (LFOs) as a 
source of revenue for county and state governments). 
The wide variety of costs and fees has increased over time and has now come 
to serve as a fiscal crutch for cash-strapped governments.237 This phenomenon 
has skewed the priorities of criminal justice systems, encouraged aggressive pros-
ecution of even minor crimes, and exacerbated the problem of mass incarcera-
tion.238
See Kevin Baker, Cruel and Unusual: Why Prisoners Shouldn’t Pay Their Way, AM. HERITAGE 
(June–July 2006), https://www.americanheritage.com/content/cruel-and-usual [https://perma.cc/87AA- 
YB2K] (“A government that can fob off costs on criminals has an incentive to find criminals 
everywhere.”). 
 And the possibility of requiring poor defendants themselves to fund the 
233. See THE FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 9, at 2 (describing police appearing to view some 
African American residents “less as constituents to be protected than as potential offenders and sources 
of revenue”). 
234. See Wright & Logan, supra note 19, at 2070 (“Collecting such fees from defendants remains 
politically popular despite the disappointing monetary results that typically accrue.” (footnote omitted)). 
235. 
236. 
237. See Logan & Wright, supra note 29, at 1190; see also THE FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 9, at 
14 (detailing the importance of court costs and fees to the Ferguson revenue fund). 
238. 
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vast machinery of criminal justice systems “creates perverse incentives that pres-
sure both courts and counsel to ignore the consequences of recoupment.”239 
The increasing practice of imposing user fees on criminal defendants coincides 
with an ever-expanding web of collateral consequences that make it difficult for 
those convicted of crimes to obtain employment.240 Since the Court decided 
Fuller, these surcharges have multiplied and defendants have become more 
aware of surcharges as a routine aspect of criminal procedure. The practice of 
imposing user fees is at once more routine and also more damaging to defendants 
now than it was, and the burdens of a commodified criminal procedure system 
fall more heavily on disadvantaged groups.241 Because of this changed historical 
context, we can see more clearly the dangers of using costs and fees either as a 
revenue generator or as a disincentive to the exercise of trial rights. Fuller, there-
fore, should be reexamined in light of this changed context. As the seriousness of 
even a minor conviction continues to rise, as measured in both direct and collat-
eral consequences,242 the effect of a tax on trial rights becomes more pernicious. 
CONCLUSION 
Tom Barrett was charged in 2012 with stealing a can of beer worth less than 
two dollars.243 
Shapiro, supra note 36; see also Joseph Shapiro, Measures Aimed at Keeping People Out of Jail 
Punish the Poor, NPR (May 24, 2014, 4:58 PM), https://www.npr.org/2014/05/24/314866421/ 
measures-aimed-at-keeping-people-out-of-jail-punish-the-poor [https://perma.cc/2GCY-Z4YA]. 
He was offered a court-appointed lawyer but decided to represent 
himself to avoid being charged the additional $50 fee that Georgia charges 
defendants who are appointed a lawyer.244 “Now he says that [representing him-
self] was a mistake.”245 Barrett, who was homeless at the time of his charge, was 
sentenced to probation but could not afford the over $400 monthly payment to 
the private probation company that oversaw his probation.246 When he fell behind 
on his payments, his probation was revoked and he was sent to jail.247 The effects 
of this kind of economic calculus are predictable and preventable,248 
See Cass R. Sunstein, It Captures Your Mind, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Sept. 26, 2013), https://www. 
nybooks.com/articles/2013/09/26/it-captures-your-mind/ [https://perma.cc/29D2-LESJ] (“Because they 
lack money, poor people must focus intensely on the economic consequences of expenditures that 
and courts 
239. Colgan, supra note 66, at 1932. 
240. See Wayne A. Logan, Informal Collateral Consequences, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1103–04 & 
n.6 (2013) (citing Kathleen M. Olivares et al., The Collateral Consequences of a Felony Conviction: A 
National Study of State Legal Codes 10 Years Later, FED. PROB., Sept. 1996, at 10, 11–15 and Michael 
Pinard, Reflections and Perspectives on Reentry and Collateral Consequences, 100 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1213, 1214–15 (2010)) (discussing the marked increase in collateral consequences for 
criminal convictions). 
241. See Sobol, supra note 24, at 516 (“The adverse impact of this two-tiered system on the poor and 
minorities is reflected in disproportionate assessment of fees, additional monetary sanctions, barriers to 
re-entry, and stress on families.”). 
242. See King, supra note 41, at 20–36 (discussing how misdemeanor convictions affect criminal 
defendants and specifically detailing several categories of potential collateral consequences). 
243. 
244. Shapiro, supra note 243. 
245. Shapiro, supra note 36. 
246. Shapiro, supra note 243. 
247. Id. 
248. 
2019] PRIVATIZING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 595 
wealthy people consider trivial and not worth worrying over.”). A court system could, therefore, either 
make procedural safeguards like the right to counsel the default choice out of which a defendant could 
affirmatively opt, or at least provide corrective information about the increasingly severe collateral 
consequences of even minor convictions. 
and legislatures should take steps to avoid putting poor defendants like Mr. 
Barrett in this situation. 
One preliminary measure to address the problem of privatization of trial rights 
is to ensure that all state systems are conducting indigency inquiries and waiving 
costs and fees for those unable to pay. The available evidence suggests that many 
states are simply not conducting such inquiries and many of the statutes imposing 
fees on the exercise of trial rights do not even provide for such waivers.249 States 
that do not allow for waivers of these fees based on indigency, however, are vul-
nerable to due process and equal protection attack.250 A robust commitment to 
imposing such user fees only on those with the ability to pay would ameliorate 
the most pernicious effects of these rights-based user fees. Even so, indigency 
determinations have historically been ineffective and inconsistently applied. 
Since 1983, Bearden v. Georgia has prohibited incarceration for failure to pay 
absent a finding of willfulness,251 but these protections have proven largely illu-
sory in practice.252 
Even if the truly indigent were relieved from the financial requirements of 
rights-based user fees, those criminal defendants who do not qualify as indigent 
are subject to deciding whether to pay for their constitutional rights. It is hard to 
imagine that the result will be anything other than a chilling effect on the exercise 
of these rights, especially as they become a more common and well-known aspect 
of our criminal justice system. As more people become aware of the piecemeal 
imposition of fees for each right invoked, defendants will become more selective 
about which ones they use, and the exercise of these rights will be chilled by the 
potential costs.253 
Beyond either of these rationales, charging defendants for the exercise of 
trial rights is offensive to our historical understanding of the nature of these 
constitutional rights. By turning rights into commodities, we degrade the 
rights. The only way to address this phenomenon is to eliminate rights-based 
user fees altogether. Just as the Supreme Court reclaimed the nature of the right 
to vote as something beyond commerce and the market in Harper v. Virginia 
249. See Logan & Wright, supra note 29, at 1189, 1205 (noting that “[s]ome, but not all, of [the 
jurisdictions requiring defendants to pay fees for appointed counsel] allow judges to waive the fees in 
cases of extreme poverty,” but also that “courts sometimes declare that it is not necessary for a judge to 
ask whether a defendant is able to pay if there is no viable alternative that meets the state’s penological 
interests”). 
250. See id. at 1197, 1204. 
251. 461 U.S. 660, 667–68 (1983). 
252. See Logan & Wright, supra note 29, at 1225 n.369 (noting that Bearden “is often construed 
narrowly or disregarded altogether” and “[w]orse yet, it is not unusual for jurisdictions to also charge for 
the rearrest and reincarceration resulting from failure to pay”). 
253. See Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 51 (1974) (addressing the argument that as defendants 
become more aware of the fees associated with invocation of constitutional rights, fewer defendants will 
invoke such rights). 
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Board of Elections,254 the Court should reexamine its precedent allowing states 
to impose surcharges on defendants for exercising their rights at trial. Like the 
right to vote, trial rights should not be subject to a cost-benefit analysis. And, 
as in the election context, the costs of administering the criminal justice system 
should be borne by society as a whole rather than by those charged with 
crimes. 
Increased reliance on user fees to fund governmental functions disproportion-
ately harms those who are least able to pay.255 The majority of those caught up in 
the criminal justice system are poor,256 
See Bernadette Rabuy & Daniel Kopf, Prisons of Poverty: Uncovering the Pre-Incarceration 
Incomes of the Imprisoned, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (July 9, 2015), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/ 
reports/income.html [https://perma.cc/53E5-MLAT] (finding that “in 2014 dollars, incarcerated people 
had a median annual income of $19,185 prior to their incarceration, which is 41% less than non- 
incarcerated people of similar ages” (emphasis omitted)). 
and a disproportionate number are people 
of color.257 Over eighty percent of criminal defendants qualify for court- 
appointed counsel, even under the narrow definitions employed by some states.258 
See Lincoln Caplan, Opinion, The Right to Counsel: Badly Battered at 50, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 
2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/opinion/sunday/the-right-to-counsel-badly-battered-at-50. 
html?smid=pl-share [https://nyti.ms/2kNdLo2] (“[A]t least 80 percent of state criminal defendants 
cannot afford to pay for lawyers and have to depend on court-appointed counsel.”). 
Those unable to post bail, perversely, can end up not only being detained prior to 
trial but also being charged for the costs of that pretrial detention. Defendants of 
color have been shown to be more likely to be detained pretrial due to an inability 
to post bail.259 And, finally, because most court costs and fees are imposed as flat 
fees, without regard to a defendant’s ability to pay, the burdens of paying for the 
system fall disproportionately on poor defendants.260 
Anecdotal evidence shows how difficult it can be for a poor person to pay off 
the bare minimum court costs and fees, and that burden can get significantly 
heavier if the person chooses to exercise her right to counsel or other elective trial 
rights. “According to Federal Reserve surveys, fully one third of Americans say 
they are ‘just getting by.’ Thirty-eight percent could not pay for a $400 emer-
gency without selling an asset or borrowing; 14 percent couldn’t pay at all.”261 
Jeff Madrick, America: The Forgotten Poor, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (June 22, 2017), https://www. 
nybooks.com/articles/2017/06/22/america-the-forgotten-poor/ [https://perma.cc/W4SS-DGWJ]. 
These costs and fees have dramatically increased in recent years, as has the total  
254. 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966). 
255. See Sobol, supra note 24, at 516 (explaining that the adverse impact of the two-tiered system 
falls disproportionately on the poor and minorities, and citing examples). 
256. 
257. Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, NAACP, http://www.naacp.org/criminal-justice-fact-sheet/ 
[https://perma.cc/M9GS-FZUT] (last visited Dec. 29, 2018) (detailing racial disparities in incarceration 
in the American criminal justice system). 
258. 
259. See RAM SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, INCARCERATION’S FRONT DOOR: THE 
MISUSE OF JAILS IN AMERICA 15 (2015) (“Black men are also disproportionately held pretrial as a result 
of an inability to post monetary bail.”). 
260. See Sobol, supra note 24, at 518 & nn.273–75 (“Financial sanctions . . . disproportionately 
impact those at lower income levels. Typically, fines and fees in the United States system are imposed 
without consideration of the income of defendants.” (footnotes omitted)). 
261. 
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amount of personal debt attributable to criminal justice costs and fees.262 The 
growth of financial penalties, whether classified as fines, restitution, or fees, has 
tracked the phenomenon of hyper-incarceration over the past four decades.263 
By charging additional fees for the exercise of trial rights, states transform 
those fundamental rights into commodities. No state has yet begun to charge 
defendants for each peremptory strike used, or for each hour of court time taken 
up by their trials, but the logic of these hypothetical absurdities is not different 
from the examples of states charging defendants for other procedural rights. 
This intrusion of market ideology into an area that had previously been seen in 
a different light has at least two broad problems: it exacerbates structural unfair-
ness in a system that already disadvantages poor people, and it degrades our con-
ception of fundamental rights.264 With regard to the first, placing a price tag on a 
fundamental right may well have the effect of making it available to one group of 
defendants but practically unavailable to another. “In a society where everything 
is for sale, life is harder for those of modest means. The more money can buy, the 
more affluence (or the lack of it) matters.”265 
A deeper critique of the commodification of trial rights, however, has to do 
with the way we conceive of those rights and their place in our constitutional 
structure. Even if we accept the idea that poor people have reduced access to pro-
cedural safeguards in criminal trials, we may object to positioning these rights as 
just one more good to be bought or sold. Discussing the intrusion of market norms 
and practices into what had been more sacred realms, Michael Sandel writes: 
[I]n order to decide where [the market] belongs, and where it doesn’t, it is not 
enough to argue about property rights on the one hand and fairness on the 
other. We also have to argue about the meaning of social practices and the 
goods they embody. And we have to ask, in each case, whether commercializ-
ing the practice would degrade it.266 
Once we see the right to a trial by jury as something that might cost us $125 (as a 
six-person jury would in the state of Washington) or $250 (as a twelve-person 
jury would in the state of Washington), and a bench trial as something that would 
cost us nothing,267 we have entered the world of market values. And we have 
262. See DILLER, supra note 25, at 5–6 (showing an increase in court-related debt in Florida since 
1996); see also Greenberg et al., supra note 235, at 1100 n.94 (collecting evidence that costs and fees 
have dramatically increased in recent years); Alexes Harris et al., Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal 
Debt and Social Inequality in the Contemporary United States, 115 AM. J. SOC. 1753, 1769 (2010). 
263. See Mary Fainsod Katzenstein & Mitali Nagrecha, A New Punishment Regime, 10 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 555, 556–57 (2011) (“[T]he growth of fines, fees, and other debts 
accompanied the trend line in the increase of incarceration since the early 1970s.”). 
264. See SANDEL, supra note 225, at 186 (describing his two objections about the application of 
market ideology into various areas: “[o]ne is about coercion and unfairness; the other is about corruption 
and degradation”). 
265. Id. at 8. 
266. Id. at 188. 
267. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.18.016(3)(b) (West 2018) (imposing different costs on a 
convicted defendant based on the size of the jury); WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 6.1(a), (b) (allowing a 
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profoundly changed how trial rights are considered. Reconceiving of these rights 
as something to be bought and sold not only corrupts the idea of fundamental 
rights,268 it also acts as a de facto tax on the adversarial system.  
defendant to waive a jury trial with the consent of the court, or, if he chooses a trial by jury, permitting 
him to elect between a jury of six or twelve). 
268. See SANDEL, supra note 225, at 34 (“To corrupt a good or a social practice is to degrade it, to 
treat it according to a lower mode of valuation than is appropriate to it.”). 
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